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# How (un)restrictive are we?

'Adjusted' and 'expected' asylum recognition rates in Europe

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**Cahier**

De reeks Cahier omvat de rapporten van onderzoek dat door en in opdracht van het WODC is verricht.

Opname in de reeks betekent niet dat de inhoud van de rapporten het standpunt van de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie weergeeft.

## Acknowledgements

There are large international differences in the percentage of asylum requests that states in the EU/EFTA area recognise. This study uses a statistical method to (a) calculate *adjusted* recognition rates by country of asylum, net of international differences in the composition of their asylum seeker population with respect to country of origin, age and sex, and to (b) calculate *expected* recognition rates for countries, when each of its asylum seekers would have had exactly that probability of a positive decision that he or she would have had on average in the EU/EFTA area as a whole based on his or her nationality, age and sex.

The analyses were primarily motivated by Parliamentary discussions in the Netherlands, but they have a broader relevance: the methods could be used to help monitor the degree to which European countries reach similar decisions in similar cases.

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# Inhoud

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## Summary

### Backgrounds, objectives, and analyses conducted

There are large differences among European countries in the percentage of asylum applications that states recognise. Such (first-instance) recognition rates are generally seen as the best available indicator of the willingness of states to admit asylum seekers. This is because these rates have been shown to be associated with conditions in countries of asylum that can be assumed to impact a state's willingness to admit asylum seekers: recognition rates tend to be lower when unemployment rates are high and/or when extreme right-wing parties are relatively popular. At the individual level, too, the decision to recognise or reject an asylum application is related to decision makers' political convictions on role definition: a vignette study among functionaries of the Dutch immigration and naturalisation service found that decision makers with a relatively conservative orientation rejected significantly more asylum applications than those with a more progressive orientation.

However, first-instance recognition rates are also associated, as one would expect, with societal conditions in asylum seekers' countries of origin: recognition rates tend to be higher for asylum seekers originating from politically unstable and/or unfree countries than for those originating from relatively stable and free countries. In other words, while the overall recognition rates for countries of asylum tend to be seen as indicators of the willingness of these countries to admit asylum seekers, the rates are also influenced ('confounded') by international differences in the composition of the asylum population; countries of asylum receive different asylum-seeker populations.

This study applies statistical techniques to improve the comparability of countries' overall recognition rates. Firstly, it presents adjusted recognition rates for 2014. The adjusted rate is the percentage of positive decisions in a country if international differences in the composition of the asylum-seeker population with respect to *country of citizenship*, *age*, and *sex*—other characteristics are not available via Eurostat—are held statistically constant. This situation was simulated by calculating a country's recognition rate—given the decisions that it took in its jurisdiction in comparison to what other European countries did in their jurisdictions—if that country would have been responsible for all first-instance decisions in 2014 in the EU/EFTA area as a whole (N=400,000). Secondly, it presents expected recognition rates for 2014. The expected recognition rate gives the percentage of positive decisions in a country if each asylum applicant in that country would have had exactly that probability of a positive decision that he or she had on average in 2014 in the EU/EFTA area as a whole based on his or her nationality, age, and sex (i.e. under a kind of 'statistical European norm'). Separate analyses were conducted for the probability of a positive decision on international or national grounds, and a positive decision on international grounds only (based on the Geneva conventions or the European Convention on Human Rights). Similar analyses were conducted on all first-instance decisions made in 2013. This led to largely similar results—indicating that destination effects are relatively stable, at least in a short period—and only the results for 2014 are reported. Finally, it was examined whether international differences in the probability of a positive first-instance decision are annulled at later stages of asylum procedures due to appeals, and whether countries with high recognition rates tend to receive relatively few asylum seekers.

## Relevance

Since 2012, some members of the Dutch Parliament have voiced concerns about the 'high' percentage of positive decisions in the Netherlands, and have raised questions as to why the Netherlands has a higher percentage of positive first-instance decisions than most other EU/EFTA countries. The Dutch State Secretary for Security and Justice replied that it is difficult to compare figures for different countries because each country 'is dealing with a different composition of countries of origin'. It was also hypothesised that the 'quick' procedure in the Netherlands has the effect of discouraging asylum seekers 'who are not in need of protection against return, but apply for asylum in order to obtain access to Europe'. The analysis helps to establish the position of the Netherlands when composition effects are held constant.

The findings also have broader relevance. Better indicators of destination effects are useful to monitor whether the principle of equality before the law is being upheld: the admission of asylum seekers is not, or at least not exclusively, a national competence. This makes large international differences in asylum determination outcomes problematic, especially when it concerns differences in the chances of obtaining protection on international grounds. Large international differences in decision outcomes, especially with regard to international protection, may also be perceived as arbitrary, and potentially undermine the perceived legitimacy and enforceability of asylum law. In the European context in particular, indicators of a country's willingness to admit asylum seekers that are not confounded by composition effects could help implement the idea of 'burden sharing'; i.e. the principle that those who are in need of protection should be distributed fairly among EU member states and the commitment of Member States to establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

## Results

International differences in recognition rates are found to become considerably smaller after adjusting for composition effects. At the same time, substantial differences persist, especially—but not exclusively—when positive decisions on national grounds count as recognitions. When only the positive decisions on international grounds—i.e. on the basis of the Geneva Conventions or the European Convention on Human Rights—count as recognitions, countries with the highest adjusted recognition rates are still observed, when making all the first instance decisions in the EU/EFTA in 2014, to be recognising approximately twice as many asylum applications than countries with the lowest adjusted recognition rates. Net of the effects of international differences in asylum seekers' origin, age, and sex, the Netherlands no longer has a relatively high recognition rate and emerges as a relatively 'restrictive' European country.

## Discussion

Contrary to unadjusted rates, comparing adjusted recognition rates (or comparing observed and expected recognition rates) is a better way of assessing countries' relative willingness to admit asylum seekers. However, the adjusted and expected rates still provide suggestive rather than definitive evidence on how (un)restrictive countries are in their admission decisions. These rates should primarily be used to ask additional questions on the lack of international convergence that remains. What



could explain the high adjusted rates in country X? What explains the low rates of country Y if they are not due to the compositional differences that are accounted for? The scientific literature suggests that international differences in the willingness to admit asylum seekers play a substantial role, for example in connection with international differences in unemployment or differences in the popularity (and political influence) of anti-immigration parties. Additionally, there may well be certain procedural explanations (such as the *Duldung* system in Germany, see the introduction). It therefore seems advisable to perform a comparative study on similarities and differences between asylum procedures in the EU/EFTA area. Several methodological limitations should be taken into consideration and the findings should be interpreted with some caution (the main limitations are mentioned in the introduction). Two limitations were overcome to some extent by conducting explorative additional analyses. Firstly, no support was found for the hypothesis that international differences in the outcome of first-instance decisions are systematically repaired at later stages of the asylum procedure: the chances of a positive final decision after a first-instance rejection are relatively low in most countries, and there is no evidence that countries with low (adjusted) recognition rates in the first instance eventually accept an extraordinarily high number of asylum seekers due to successful appeals or repeated asylum applications. This finding underscores the importance of the first-instance decisions. Secondly, no evidence was found that countries with the highest (adjusted) recognition rates receive fewer asylum seekers, which could indicate that they can 'afford' high recognition rates because they are discouraging asylum applications more than other countries. Quite to the contrary, it turns out that countries with high (adjusted) recognition rates tend to receive more, not fewer, asylum applications per inhabitant. A possible explanation for this pattern is that asylum seekers try to apply for asylum in countries with relatively high (perceived) admission chances. This observation, too, confirms that first-instance recognition rates matter, and that it is important to optimise the comparability of these rates by calculating 'adjusted' and/or 'expected' recognition rates, using the available information on asylum seekers' nationality, age, and sex.



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background and research questions

There are large differences among European countries in the percentage of asylum requests that states recognise. In 2014, according to the 14-05-2014 Eurostat update,<sup>1</sup> 47% of all first instance decisions in the European Union and the EFTA states<sup>2</sup> (hereafter: EU/EFTA) were positive, but that figure ranged from 9% for Hungary to 94% for Bulgaria.<sup>3</sup> The Netherlands reached a positive decision in 67% of the cases, and ranked sixth in the EU/EFTA area as to the highest percentage of positive first instance decisions (after Bulgaria, Sweden, Cyprus, Malta and Switzerland).<sup>4</sup>

Since 2012, some members of the Dutch Parliament have voiced concerns about the 'high' percentage of positive decisions in the Netherlands, and have raised questions as to why the Netherlands has a higher percentage of positive first instance decisions than most other EU/EFTA countries.<sup>5</sup> The State Secretary for Security and Justice replied that it is difficult to compare figures for different countries because each country 'is dealing with a different composition of countries of origin'.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Dutch figures also include family members who receive what is called a 'dependent asylum permit' after reuniting with an admitted asylum seeker. In other EU/EFTA countries, such permits are, according to the State Secretary, not included in the positive decisions. Additionally, it was hypothesised that the 'quick' procedure in the Netherlands has the effect of discouraging asylum seekers 'who are not in need of protection against return, but apply for asylum in order to obtain access to Europe' "[die] geen bescherming tegen terugkeer behoeven maar asiel aanvragen om zich toegang tot Europa te verschaffen".<sup>7</sup>

After these Parliamentary debates, the Eurostat figures for the Netherlands were brought into line with the EASO directives by excluding various categories of recognitions involving reuniting family members. However, the adjustments barely affected the Netherlands' position in the EU/EFTA area. On the basis of the original 2013 (Eurostat, 2014), which included recognitions involving reuniting family members, the Netherlands ranked fifth. As was mentioned, the Netherlands ranked

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<sup>1</sup> All figures on first instance decisions in 2014 are based on the Eurostat 14-05-2015 update. Figures may have changed somewhat due to more recent updates.

<sup>2</sup> Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein.

<sup>3</sup> In Liechtenstein, the percentage of positive decisions was even lower than in Hungary (0%), but Liechtenstein only took 10 decisions in 2014. (Liechtenstein was excluded from the analysis.)

<sup>4</sup> Liechtenstein is not included in this ranking.

<sup>5</sup> On April 4 2014, Member of Parliament Mr. Azmani, a member of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), questioned the State Secretary for Security and Justice after having read an Eurostat news release on the increase of asylum requests in 2013. Mr. Azmani wanted to know why the percentage of positive decisions is relatively high in the Netherlands. Similar questions were asked in 2012 and 2013 by the Members of Parliament Mrs. Van Nieuwenhuizen (VVD) and Mr. Fritsma of the Party for Freedom (PVV). For the Parliamentary questions see: *Kamervragen* 2014Z06205, 2013-2014, *Aanhangsel van Handelingen II* 2011/12, 3132, and *Aanhangsel van Handelingen II*, 2012/13, 2591. For the Eurostat news release, see Eurostat, 'Large increase to almost 435,000 asylum applicants registered in the EU28 in 2013', Stat/14/46, 24 March 2014.

<sup>6</sup> *Aanhangsel van Handelingen II* 2013/2014, 1909.

<sup>7</sup> *Aanhangsel van Handelingen II* 2013/2014, 1909.

sixth on the basis of the 2014 figures, which no longer include the reuniting family members who are to be excluded on the basis of Eurostat definitions.<sup>8</sup>

Three research questions guided this study: (1) To what extent do international differences in first instance recognition rates exist when known characteristics of the asylum population (in terms of applicants' countries of citizenship, age and sex) are held constant statistically? (2) What is the position of the Netherlands when such composition effects are held constant?, and (3) What is the expected number of positive first instance decisions in a country, if each of its asylum seekers would have precisely that probability on a positive decision that he or she would have on average in the EU/EFTA area as a whole, based on his or her country of citizenship, age and sex?

## 1.2 Broader relevance

Although the analyses were primarily motivated by the Parliamentary discussions in the Netherlands, they have a broader relevance. Politicians and social scientists tend to see recognition rates in the first instance as the best available indicator of the willingness of states to admit asylum seekers (Holzer et al. 2000; Neumayer, 2004, 2005; Mascini and Van Bochove, 2009). This is because such rates have been shown to be associated with conditions in countries of asylum that can be assumed to impact a state's willingness to admit asylum seekers: recognition rates tend to be lower when unemployment rates are high and/or when anti-immigration parties are relatively popular (Neumayer, 2005). At the individual level, too, among decision makers of the immigration and naturalisation service, the decision to recognise or reject an asylum claim turns out to be related to decision makers' political convictions on role definition. A vignette study by Mascini (2008) among Dutch decision makers found that functionaries with a relatively conservative orientation rejected significantly more asylum applications than decision makers with a more progressive orientation. However, first instance recognition rates are also associated, as one would expect, with societal conditions in countries of origin: recognition rates tend to be higher for asylum seekers originating from politically unstable and/or unfree countries (Neumayer, 2005). In other words, the overall recognition rate for countries of asylum are often seen as indicators of the willingness of these countries to admit asylum seekers, even though the rates are also influenced – researchers would say: 'confounded' – by international differences in the composition of the asylum population. In both Eurostat and the UNHCR statistical annex, recognition rates can be broken down by country of citizenship of the asylum seeker, and the Eurostat data allow for further specification by sex and age, but it cannot be established through these figures what the overall recognition rate for countries would be compared to other countries, when registered characteristics of the asylum population (in terms of country of citizenship, age and sex) are held constant statistically.

In the European context in particular, indicators of a country's willingness to admit asylum seekers that are not confounded by composition effects could help implement the idea of 'burden sharing' (see Thielemann, 2003); i.e., the principle that those who are in need of protection should be distributed fairly among EU member states, and the commitment of Member States to establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Large international differences in the willingness

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<sup>8</sup> On the basis of the 14-05-2014 Eurostat update. The ranking does not include Liechtenstein. The Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) has indicated that reunifying family members who submit an independent asylum request are still included in the Eurostat figures.

to recognise asylum seekers are clearly at odds with the principles, also because asylum seekers who find themselves being rejected in a relatively restrictive country cannot, according to the Dublin Regulation, be admitted in a different (more permissive) European country. Outside the European context, too, a better indicator is useful to monitor whether the principle of equality before the law is being upheld: the admission of asylum seekers is not, at least not exclusively, a national competence, making large international differences in asylum determination outcomes problematic, especially when there are differences in the chances of obtaining protection on international grounds, i.e. because of the Geneva Conventions or, in the European context, because of subsidiary protection status under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Large international differences in decision outcomes, especially with regard to international protection, may also be perceived as arbitrary, and can potentially undermine the perceived legitimacy and enforceability of asylum law (cf. Leerkes, forthcoming).

### 1.3 Method

This study reports the results of a statistical method to (a) *adjust* countries' first instance recognition rates for international differences regarding three characteristics of the asylum seeker population – its composition in terms of (1) national origin, (2) age, (3) sex – and (b) to calculate *expected* recognition rates for each EU/EFTA country, given its unique asylum seeker population, but assuming that its decisions are in line with the admission chances in the EU/EFTA area as a whole for the kind of asylum seekers that it receives. Eurostat defines first instance decisions as follows: 'decisions (positive and negative) considering applications for international protection as well as the grants of authorisations to stay for humanitarian reasons, including decisions under priority and accelerated procedures taken by administrative or judicial bodies in Member States'. Eurostat distinguishes first instance decisions from 'final decisions': 'decision[s] taken by administrative or judicial bodies in appeal or in review and which are no longer subject to remedy'.<sup>9</sup> The adjusted recognition rate gives the estimated percentage of positive first instance decisions in each EU/EFTA country, had all EU/EFTA countries received the same complex asylum seeker population in terms of country of origin, age, and sex. This condition is simulated statistically by assuming that each country would have made *all* the decisions in the EU/EFTA area as a whole, using an estimate of its relative (un)restrictiveness based on the decisions that it actually took in its own jurisdiction compared to what other countries did. The adjusted rates are especially useful to *rank* countries in terms of their restrictiveness when composition effects are held constant, and to illustrate the magnitude of international differences that remain among the EU/EFTA countries after measured international differences in the composition of asylum seeker populations are held constant. The regression models underlying the adjusted rates estimate how variance in decision outcomes, which cannot be predicted by country of citizenship ('the origin effect'), age ('the age effect'), and sex ('the sex effect'), is related to country of asylum (indicating a kind of 'destination effect').

The expected recognition rate gives the expected percentage of positive decisions in each EU/EFTA country under the assumption that asylum seekers' chances of a

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<sup>9</sup> It is somewhat unclear what is exactly included in the final decisions, given the following remark in the Eurostat 'metadata': '[I]t is not intended that asylum statistics should cover rare or exceptional cases determined by the highest courts. Thus, the statistics related to the final decisions should refer to what is effectively a final decision in the vast majority of all cases: i.e. that all normal routes of appeal have been exhausted.'

positive decision in that country would be equal to their expected (average) chances of a positive decision in the EU/EFTA area as a whole, based on their country of citizenship, age and sex. Comparing expected rates to observed rates (the observed recognition rate is the rate that is normally reported by Eurostat) is especially useful when attempting to estimate how many more, or less, positive decisions were reached in country X compared to what one would expect in such a situation when applying a European (statistical) norm. Such expected rates could perhaps be included in regular Eurostat reports: Is a recognition rate for country X really that high or low given what one would expect for the kind of asylum seekers it is dealing with? The regression models underlying the expected rates estimate the (average) origin, age, and sex effects in the EU/EFTA area as a whole, and then apply these average admission chances for different types of asylum seekers to the asylum population that country X was dealing with. The details of the statistical models underlying the adjusted and expected recognition rates are reported in Appendices 1, 2 and 3.

The analyses are based on all first instance decisions reached in 2014 by 30 EU/EFTA countries on all asylum requests (both first and eventual additional requests) submitted in 2014 or earlier. Two EU/EFTA countries were excluded from the analyses: Austria had not yet submitted Eurostat asylum data for 2014 and Liechtenstein took too few decisions in 2014 for statistical analysis. Besides Liechtenstein, another eight EU/EFTA countries reached fewer than 500 first instance decisions in 2014 (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Iceland). The results for these eight countries are relatively unreliable because of the low numbers and Eurostat's practice to round data to the nearest five, and are therefore only reported in Appendix 2. The year 2014 was chosen because it was the most recent year available, and because the data were expected to be more comparable than for 2013: contrary to other years, and in accordance with Eurostat stipulations, the 2014 data are no longer supposed to include negative decisions concerning asylum seekers who had already been rejected in another European country that had accepted responsibility for the asylum seeker under the Dublin regulation.<sup>10</sup> (According to the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) the data for the Netherlands still include such decisions, as it is not yet possible to exclude them for technical reasons). All data are from the Eurostat 14-05-2015 update; figures may have changed to some extent due to more recent updates. Similar analyses were conducted on all first instance decisions taken in 2013. This led to largely similar results – indicating that destination effects are relatively stable, at least in a short period – and only the results for 2014 are reported here.<sup>11</sup>

Separate analyses were conducted for (1) *all positive decisions*, i.e., positive decision on international grounds (Geneva Conventions, ECHR) or on national grounds (what is often called 'humanitarian protection') and (2) positive decisions on *international grounds*, i.e., on the basis of the Geneva convention or the ECHR.

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<sup>10</sup> Negative decisions involving applicants with an asylum residence permit issued by a different European country are still supposed to be included in the counts.

<sup>11</sup> The 30 EU/EFTA countries each have a ranking derived from their odds ratios in Model 3 and 6, respectively (figure 1 and 2 show the ranking order of the countries when eight 'smaller' countries are excluded from the ranking). Similar ranking orders were calculated for 2013, and the correlation between the 2013 and the 2014 ranking order was calculated using Spearman's rho. When comparing the two adjusted ranking orders for 2013 and 2014 (for all positive decisions and decisions on international grounds), Spearman's rho equals 0.74 and 0.76 respectively. This means that the position of countries does change somewhat from year to year, but that the ranking order does not change fundamentally, at least not in such a relatively short time span.

In the statistical models underlying the latter rates, positive decisions on *national* grounds were merged with rejections (see Appendix 1). It was decided to also control for sex and age because research indicates that both variables matter in admission decisions: Mascini and Van Bochove (2009) have shown that male and single claimants have lower success rates in the Dutch asylum procedure, a pattern that the authors attribute to a tendency among decision makers to stereotype single male applicants as criminal or 'bogus' refugees. For the present purposes, one can be agnostic about the precise mechanisms explaining such patterns. It could also be that single male applicants are rightfully rejected more than applicants with other demographic characteristics, because a relatively large number of single males do mostly migrate for economic reasons. What is important here is that sex and age, like country of citizenship, can be assumed to predict the outcome of admission decisions, quite independently of where the asylum request has been submitted. (The analyses confirm that sex and age indeed tend to be related to decision outcomes across the EU/EFTA area in similar ways).<sup>12</sup>

#### 1.4 Limitations

Comparing adjusted recognition rates for countries, or comparing their expected recognition rates to their observed rates, is a better way of establishing the relative overall willingness of a country to recognise asylum applications than by merely looking at unadjusted, actually observed rates. The analyses are capable of identifying systematic differences that remain after origin, age and sex effects are held constant. While the models are quite powerful – it turns out 84% of the decision outcomes in Europe in 2014 can be predicted adequately on the basis of country of origin, country of asylum, age and sex<sup>13</sup> – it should be emphasised that they are not perfect; the adjusted and expected rates provide us with better indicators, but still give suggestive rather than definitive evidence on the relative willingness of countries to grant asylum requests. As such, they are mostly useful to generate additional questions: Why does country X or Y deviate from the general pattern if not because of the compositional differences that are accounted for by the models? Why does the expected recognition rate for country X or Y differ so much from their observed rates? When reading the results, the following limitations should be kept in mind:

- 1 The validity of the results depends on the quality (correctness, completeness, comparability) of the administrative data that have been made available by Eurostat. The IND and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) have indicated that various steps have been taken in recent years to improve the quality of the data. For example, data about reuniting family members were excluded for the Netherlands for 2013 and 2014, and certain categories of inadmissible asylum requests ('rejected Dublin claimants') are now supposed to be excluded from the Eurostat data. The quality of the data could not be assessed independently as part of this research project (this would be a large research project in and of itself). It is probable that there still are certain procedural

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<sup>12</sup> There is no EU/EFTA country where being male is associated with significantly higher chances of receiving a positive decision at the  $p=.01$  level, but there are 16 EE/EFTA countries where they have significantly lower chances than females. There are only three EEA countries (Denmark, Greece, UK) where another age category has significantly lower chances of a positive decision at the  $p=.01$  level than the 18-34 age category. (In Denmark and Greece, the lowest probability of a positive decision is associated with the 65+ age category; in the UK it is the 35-64 category.)

<sup>13</sup> See appendix 2, Model 3.

- differences between countries.<sup>14</sup> In any event, it is clear that future research would benefit from (1) making data available on the outcomes of *first* asylum requests, and (2) excluding all decisions that pertain to 'inadmissible' asylum requests (not just of persons who have already been rejected in a different 'Dublin' country).
- 2 The characteristics of the asylum population may differ between EU countries in unmeasured ways. For example, it may be that Iraqis in Sweden are from different regions or groups in Iraq than Iraqis who apply for asylum in Greece, and that Iraqis who find themselves being rejected in Greece would also be rejected in Sweden. This is called the problem of 'unobserved heterogeneity'. Although the large number of observations should reduce the influence of 'coincidental' differences between countries, possible problems of unobserved structural international differences can only be reduced if additional information were made available (for example if countries also began registering the asylum seeker's region of origin). To completely dispense with the problem, countries should conduct an experiment and randomly distribute asylum applications among the EU/EFTA countries for assessment (provided that countries would then make decisions as they normally do).
  - 3 A low adjusted recognition rate in the first instance may erroneously indicate low protection levels. Rejections of asylum applications in the first instance may be annulled by positive decisions at a later stage as a result of successful appeals and revised decisions. Countries with low recognition rates in the first instance could end up admitting a similar number of asylum seekers to the extent that a large number of rejected asylum seekers successfully manage to appeal against these rejections. This limitation can only be overcome if countries began registering cohort data, so that asylum seekers can be followed during different stages of the asylum procedure. In the absence of such cohort data, it was nonetheless possible to look at the ratio between the number of first instance rejections and positive final decisions (taking a longer period so as to reduce the influence of fluctuations in cohort sizes), and to examine whether that ratio is systematically different for countries with a low or high (adjusted) percentage of positive decisions in the first instance (see section 2.3 for the results).
  - 4 There are other ways in which low recognition rates may underestimate protection levels. In Germany, for example, a significant number of asylum seekers receive what is called *Duldung* (Morris, 2001). Such individuals, who are exempted from deportation for the duration of the *Duldung* status, are often housed in reception centres and may even have access to the German labour market. *Duldung* is not considered a residence permit, however, and such persons therefore end up in the Eurostat data as rejections. (By implication, one could argue that the German recognition rate probably underestimates protection levels compared to other countries). It is unknown how many other European countries make use of *Duldung*-like arrangements. Similarly, there may be EU/EFTA countries with low deportation risks where rejected asylum seekers obtain a kind of de facto protection as unauthorized immigrants. Future research could look at such factors by examining 'Assisted Voluntary Return' (AVR) and deportation rates.

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<sup>14</sup> For example, in the Netherlands the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) first communicates an 'intention' (*voornemen*) to the asylum seeker indicating whether it intends to honour or reject the asylum request. The asylum seeker may respond with a 'perspective' (*zienswijze*), possibly leading to a positive first instance decision after a negative intention. It may be that in other countries, similar cases would end up in the Eurostat data as first instance rejections.



- 5 Conversely, a high (adjusted) recognition rate does not necessarily indicate a high willingness to protect asylum seekers. Some countries with high recognition rates may actually be discouraging asylum applications more than other countries, for example by 'pushing back' potential applicants at the border, or by granting asylum residence permit holders fewer rights, thereby minimising the advantage of applying for asylum over staying in the country irregularly. Then, when almost nobody is able or willing to apply for asylum, the few who do can be accepted easily. This problem is difficult to solve, but it was possible to examine whether countries with high (adjusted) recognition rates tend to receive few applications per inhabitant (the results are reported in section 2.3).
- 6 There may be significant regional variation *within* countries of asylum in how asylum applications are dealt with. Research in the Netherlands and Switzerland shows that in some regions, the chances of a positive decision may be significantly higher than in other regions (Holzer et al., 200; Mascini, 2002). The present study only looks at national 'averages'.
- 7 Finally, a country's overall adjusted recognition rate may mask that its willingness to admit asylum seekers, compared to other receiving countries, varies considerably between different categories of asylum seekers. It may be, for example, that country X has a relatively high overall (adjusted) recognition rate, because it recognises claims by certain categories of asylum seekers more than other countries, while it is actually less willing than other EU/EFTA countries to admit asylum seekers with other characteristics (Finland and Lithuania, for example, seemed to be especially unrestrictive to Ukrainian asylum seekers in 2014). Such interaction effects, which could be explored in future analyses, were not included in the present study due to a lack of existing research on relevant interactions. (Similarly, there is a possibility that other variables, such as age, have different effects for different groups of asylum seekers. For example, men of working age may be more likely to be (seen as) 'economic migrants' than women of working age.)



## 2 Results

### 2.1 Adjusted recognition rates

Figure 1 presents three recognition rates for 22 'larger' EU/EFTA countries that made more than 500 first instance decisions in 2014: one unadjusted rate (Model 1) and two adjusted rates (Model 2 and Model 3). In the analyses underlying the figures in Figure 1, all positive first instance decisions count as recognitions, so both on international grounds ('Geneva', 'ECHR') and on national grounds ('humanitarian status'). The countries are sorted by their final adjusted rate – from low to high –, i.e., the rate that adjusts for compositional differences in asylum seekers' national origin, age and sex (Model 3).

The total number of first instance decisions by EU/EFTA country is shown in Table 1 in section 2.2. The fewer decisions a country makes, the more unreliable the statistical estimates become, also because of Eurostat's practice of rounding figures in cells to the nearest 5. Tentative rates for eight countries (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Iceland) are therefore only reported in Appendix 2, which also shows the 95% confidence intervals for all adjusted rates. In Croatia, Iceland, Latvia and Slovenia the adjusted recognition rates seem to have been well below the European average; in three 'smaller' countries (Estonia, Portugal and Slovakia) the rates do not differ from the European average, and the adjusted rate of only one 'smaller' country (Lithuania) seems to be above the European average.

The first rate (Model 1) is the unadjusted recognition rate for countries and is equal to what Eurostat normally reports. The adjustment of the rate proceeds in two steps. The second rate illustrates the estimated relative (un)restrictiveness of individual countries, net of origin effects (without making use of information about asylum seekers' age or sex). The third rate gives the percentage of positive first instance decisions that is estimated to have been reached by the EU/EFTA country net of origin, age, and sex effects (the regression model underlying the latter rate also makes use of information about asylum seekers' registered age and sex). The two adjusted rates indicate the percentage of positive first instance decisions that each country is estimated to reach had it taken all the decisions in the EU/AREA in 2014.

Among the 22 EU/EFTA countries that reached at least 500 first instance decisions in 2014, the country with the lowest recognition rate after all adjustments (Model 3) turns out to be Greece, which, according to the statistical models, would have reached a positive decision in 25% of the cases, had it made all the first instance decisions in the EU/EFTA in 2014. The EU/EFTA country with the highest final adjusted recognition rate turns out to be Italy, which is estimated to have reached a positive decision in 68% of the cases (2.7 times more positive decisions than Greece).

For several countries, including the Netherlands, the adjusted rates differ considerably from the unadjusted rate. Bulgaria's recognition rate, for instance, goes down from 94% (unadjusted rate) to 48% (final adjusted rate). The reason for that decrease is that Bulgaria's decisions often involved Syrians, more so than in other EU/EFTA countries.<sup>15</sup> Syrians had high recognition chances throughout the

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<sup>15</sup> Destination effects become more difficult to model for countries with relatively homogeneous asylum seeker populations, such as Bulgaria. However, the VIF values (calculated with the collin package for Stata) do not indicate serious multicollinearity issues (all VIF values are 5.0 or lower, usually approximately 1, with the

EU/EFTA in 2014, so if a country received many Syrians, its recognition rate is likely to increase considerably because of that 'origin effect'. The adjustments remove the effects of such compositional differences.

The recognition rate for the Netherlands goes down from 67% (unadjusted rate) to 39% (final adjusted rate), which is well below the European average of 47%. This indicates that the Netherlands indeed received a relatively large number of applications involving asylum seekers who tended to have high recognition chances throughout the EU/EFTA in 2014. It cannot be established, however, whether this is because of the 'quick' Dutch asylum procedure, as the State Secretary suggested in Parliament. Based on its final adjusted rate, the Netherlands actually emerges as a relatively restrictive country with regard to first instance recognition chances.

The recognition rates of other countries – including Greece, Hungary, France, Poland and Italy – increase as a result of the adjustments. This suggests that such countries were, more than other countries, dealing with asylum seekers that tended to have relatively low recognition chances throughout the EU/EFTA in 2014. By only looking at unadjusted recognition rates, one could easily underestimate the recognition chances in these countries compared to other EU/EFTA countries. For example, Italy's unadjusted recognition rate was relatively low because its decisions often pertained to male asylum seekers in the 18 to 34 age category originating from West-African countries like Nigeria. Asylum seekers with these characteristics had low recognition chances in the EU/EFTA in 2014, but were actually relatively successful in obtaining asylum in Italy (those who were successful often received humanitarian protection status, not 'international protection'; Italy's position is lower when recognitions on national grounds are counted as rejections, see hereafter).

Figure 2 resembles Figure 1, but presents recognition rates that only pertain to positive decisions on international grounds (with recognitions on national grounds counting as negative decisions). Again, substantial differences in recognition rates persist when the effects of origin, age and sex are held constant, and Greece and Hungary again emerge as the most 'restrictive' EU/EFTA countries. It is Bulgaria, however, not Italy, where recognition chances on international grounds are estimated to have been the highest net of composition effects. Switzerland, too, scores considerably lower than in Figure 1, indicating that positive decisions in Switzerland, like in Italy, were frequently based on national grounds.

As one might expect, the differences in the adjusted recognition rates on international grounds are somewhat smaller than the differences when positive decisions on national grounds also count as recognitions. It should be noted, however, that there is probably a certain degree of substitution between international and national protection, meaning that part of those receiving protection on national grounds had probably received protection on international grounds should protection on national grounds not have been an option. By counting positive decisions on national grounds as rejections, as is done in Figure 2, eventual international differences in the willingness to provide international protection are probably underestimated to some extent. Countries like Switzerland, which have low adjusted recognition rates on international grounds but relatively high recognition rates on national grounds, would probably have higher recognition rates on international grounds if national grounds were not considered.

Among the 22 EU/EFTA countries that reached more than 500 decisions in 2014, fifteen countries have higher adjusted recognition rates on international grounds than the Netherlands, after adjusting for composition effects. As in Figure 1, the


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exception of the dummy 'sex unknown' and 'age unknown'). This indicates that destination effects for individual countries can be estimated reliably.


Netherlands is located at the upper end of the lowest tier. Except for Switzerland and Greece, all EU/EFTA countries receiving a relatively large number of asylum applications in 2014 – including Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Denmark and the United Kingdom – have higher adjusted recognition rates on international grounds than the Netherlands.

While international differences in recognition rates persist, they do become considerably smaller when composition effects are controlled. This can be established visually in Figures 1 and 2 by looking at the countries with the lowest and highest recognition rates: the values at both ends of the spectrum clearly become less extreme after adjustment. It can also be established that the rates change most when origin effects are held constant. This indicates that international differences in recognition rates are more the result of international differences in asylum seekers' origin than of differences in their age or sex. Country of citizenship is also the best predictor of the decision outcome in the models underlying the adjusted rates, followed by country of asylum, age and sex. (Age and sex generally predict decision outcomes in ways that are in line with Mascini and Van Bochove 's (2009) findings for the Netherlands, regardless of whether their explanation of such patterns is right; see the coefficients in Appendix 2).

**Figure 1 Unadjusted and adjusted recognition rates among EU/EFTA countries with at least 500 first instance decisions in 2014 (recognitions on international and national grounds)**



**Figure 2 Unadjusted and adjusted recognition rates among EU/EFTA countries with at least 500 first instance decisions in 2014 (recognitions on international grounds only)**



## 2.2 Expected recognition rates

The previous section reported adjusted rates, i.e., rates that countries are estimated to reach had they received the same complex asylum population in terms of citizenship, age and sex. These rates are useful to 'rank' countries net of composition effects. We can also ask a slightly different question: what would the percentage of positive decisions in country X need to be – given its unique asylum seeker population (in terms of country of origin, age and sex) – if its decision outcomes are to be exactly in line with the 'European' average for such asylum seekers, i.e., if each of its asylum seekers would have had exactly that probability of a positive decision that he or she would have had on average in the EU/EFTA area as a whole based on his or her nationality, age and sex?

The results for the 22 EU/EFTA countries that took more than 500 first instance decisions in 2014 are presented in Table 1 and Table 2: Table 1 shows the results when all positive decisions count as recognitions; Table 2 shows the results when only positive decisions on international grounds count as recognitions. Contrary to section 2.2, all expected recognition rates make use of information on the applicant's country of origin, age and sex; no separate expected recognition rates are shown that are solely based on information about asylum seekers' country of origin. Appendix 3 shows the 95% confidence intervals of these expected rates, and also shows tentative results for the eight EU/EFTA countries that took less than 500 decisions.

In countries with low adjusted recognition rates, the actually observed recognition rate is significantly lower than the expected recognition rate. For example, given the asylum population found in Greece, according to the model this country was expected to reach 4,928 positive decisions in 2014 instead of the 1,930 positive decisions that it actually took out of 13,285 first instance decisions. In other words, Greece admitted 2,998 fewer asylum seekers than one would expect given the type of asylum seekers that it received and the decision patterns in Europe at large. While the observed recognition rate for Greece was 15%, one would expect a recognition rate of 37%. Sweden, by contrast, has an expected recognition rate of 73% and an observed rate of 77%, and admitted 1,434 more asylum seekers than one would expect given the kind of asylum seekers it was dealing with. Given the composition of the asylum population that the Netherlands received, one would expect a 72% recognition rate instead of the 67% that it actually realised, possibly indicating that about a thousand (958) rejected asylum seekers in the Netherlands may have received a positive decision had they been distributed randomly over the EU/EFTA area as a whole (but matching the international distribution of asylum decisions for 2014), and applied for asylum in the country where they happened to be sent to.

When only positive decisions on international grounds count as recognitions, largely similar patterns are found, but the difference between the observed and expected rates is smaller for countries admitting a relatively large number of asylum seekers on national grounds, such as Italy and Switzerland. Based on the degree of international protection that asylum seekers with the characteristics found in the Netherlands obtained in the 30 EU/EFTA countries as a whole, one would expect a recognition rate for the Netherlands of 67% on international grounds, against the actually observed rate on international grounds of 63% – possibly indicating that 785 asylum seekers who were rejected in the Netherlands in 2014 may have received international protection had they been distributed randomly over the EU/EFTA area as a whole (but matching the actual international distribution of asylum decisions for 2014), and had they been assessed by the EU/EFTA country where they happened to find themselves.



**Table 1 Actual and expected recognitions among EU/EFTA countries with at least 500 first instance decisions in 2014 (recognitions on international and national grounds)**

	Total # decisions	Actual # positive decisions	Expected # positive decisions	Number of 'excess' positive decisions	Actual recognition rate	Expected recognition rate
Belgium	20,475	8,095	8,004	+91	40%	39%
Bulgaria	7,410	7,000	6,805	+195	94%	92%
Cyprus	1,290	985	983	+2	76%	76%
Czech Republic	970	350	282	+68	36%	29%
Denmark	8,100	5,485	5,930	-445	68%	73%
Finland	3,230	2,165	1,823	+342	67%	56%
France	68,625	14,880	16,452	-1,572	22%	24%
Germany	97,415	40,555	40,944	-389	42%	42%
Greece	13,285	1,930	4,928	-2,998	15%	37%
Hungary	5,420	490	1,131	-641	9%	21%
Ireland	1,045	390	380	+10	37%	36%
Italy	35,205	20,590	12,824	+7,766	58%	36%
Luxembourg	850	120	173	-53	14%	20%
Malta	1,735	1,265	1,082	+183	73%	62%
Netherlands	18,795	12,545	13,503	-958	67%	72%
Norway	7,650	4,875	5,122	-247	64%	67%
Poland	2,675	705	667	+38	26%	25%
Romania	1,580	740	1,099	-359	47%	70%
Spain	3,610	1,580	1,855	-275	44%	51%
Sweden	40,025	30,640	29,206	+1,434	77%	73%
Switzerland	21,935	15,435	12,689	+2,746	70%	58%
United Kingdom	26,055	10,030	11,804	-1,774	38%	45%

**Table 2 Actual and expected recognitions among EU/EFTA countries with at least 500 first instance decisions in 2014 (recognitions on international grounds only)**

	Total # decisions	Actual # positive decisions	Expected # positive decisions	Number of 'excess' positive decisions	Actual recognition rate	Expected recognition rate
Belgium	20,475	8,095	6,757	+1,338	40%	33%
Bulgaria	7,410	7,000	6,451	+549	94%	87%
Cyprus	1,290	985	930	+55	76%	72%
Czech Republic	970	340	236	+104	35%	24%
Denmark	8,100	5,390	5,502	-112	67%	68%
Finland	3,230	1,870	1,470	+400	58%	46%
France	68,625	14,880	13,464	+1,416	22%	20%
Germany	97,415	38,485	36,794	+1,691	40%	38%
Greece	13,285	1,845	3,985	-2,140	14%	30%
Hungary	5,420	480	890	-410	9%	16%
Ireland	1,045	390	304	+86	37%	29%
Italy	35,205	11,250	8,265	+2,985	32%	23%
Luxembourg	850	120	144	-24	14%	17%
Malta	1,735	1,100	913	+187	63%	53%

	Total # decisions	Actual # positive decisions	Expected # positive decisions	Number of 'excess' positive decisions	Actual recognition rate	Expected recognition rate
Netherlands	18,795	11,770	12,555	-785	63%	67%
Norway	7,650	4,715	4,680	+35	62%	61%
Poland	675	420	556	-136	16%	21%
Romania	1,580	740	979	-239	47%	62%
Spain	3,610	1,580	1,601	-21	44%	44%
Sweden	40,025	29,335	27,099	+2,236	73%	68%
Switzerland	21,935	8,780	11,242	-2,462	40%	51%
United Kingdom	26,055	9,105	10,162	-1,057	35%	39%

As mentioned in the introduction, several limitations must be taken into consideration when comparing the first instance recognition rates for countries, even net of the measured composition effects. As part of this study, explorative analyses were conducted to address two of these limitations. Firstly, it was assessed whether countries with low adjusted first instance recognition rates tended to make relatively many positive final decisions. Secondly, it was examined whether countries with low adjusted recognition rates tended to receive few asylum seekers, possibly indicating that such countries were discouraging asylum applications more than other countries, and were in fact quite restrictive. The results are reported in the next section.

## 2.3 Additional analyses

### 2.3.1 First instance decisions and final decisions


Figure 3 presents the results of the first additional analysis, looking at all positive final decisions regardless of whether they were reached on international or national grounds. The horizontal axis depicts the first instance recognition rates adjusted for all registered composition effects (also see Figure 1 (Model 3)). The vertical axis shows the ratio between (a) the number of positive final decisions in the 2008-2014 period, and (b) the total number of negative first instance decisions in these seven years. This ratio, when multiplied by 100, roughly indicates the chances of a positive final decision after a negative first instance decision. Figure 4 presents similar data as Figure 3, but plots the adjusted recognition rates on international grounds, which were shown in Figure 2 (Model 6), against the ratio between (a) the number of positive final decisions on international grounds and (b) the number of negative first instance decisions plus the number of positive first instance decisions on national grounds.

A larger time period (seven years) is taken in order to reduce the influence of possible annual fluctuations in the number of people who are being rejected in the first instance. For the Netherlands, the ratio between the number of positive final decisions and negative first instance decisions in 2008-2014 turns out to be 0.089, indicating that the chances of a positive final decision after a negative first instance decision were roughly 8.9% (about 10%) in this period. Existing research conducted in the Netherlands using cohort data shows that this figure is not far off the mark: depending on the cohort, rejected asylum seekers in the 2005-2011 period had a 10% to 17% chance of obtaining an asylum residence permit as a result of appeals or new asylum applications (Leerkes et al., 2014). The ratio may underestimate the


real chances of a positive final decision to some extent, because of the increase in asylum applications in recent years (not enough time has passed for all recent rejections to have led to a final decision), but that will probably be the case for other European countries as well.

Both Figure 3 and 4 indicate that international differences arising in the first stage of the asylum procedure are not systematically repaired at later stages of the procedure. Firstly, it turns out that the ratios tend to vary in the 0-0.15 (~ 0% to 15%) range, if the statistical 'outliers' Romania and the United Kingdom are excluded. The adjusted first instance recognition rates vary considerably more, i.e., between 22% and 68% (positive decisions on international and national grounds), and between 20% and 56% (positive decision on international grounds only). Secondly, no significant relationship can be observed between the adjusted recognition rates in the first instance and the estimated chance of a positive final decision after a first instance rejection. The trend line in Figure 3 does have a slightly negative slope – indicating that asylum seekers in countries rejecting many applications in the first instance indeed have slightly higher chances of obtaining a residence permit at a later stage of the procedure – but the relationship is very weak and could well be coincidental (the correlation is not significant). Figure 4 similarly shows a weak and non-significant negative relationship between the adjusted recognition rate in the first instance and the estimated chances of obtaining international protection as a result of a positive final decision.

**Figure 3 Adjusted recognition rates 2014 (Model 3, recognitions on international and national grounds) and ratio positive final decisions versus rejections (2008-2014)**



**Figure 4 Adjusted recognition rates 2014 (Model 6, recognitions on international grounds only) and ratio positive final decisions versus rejections plus humanitarian status (2008-2014)**




### 2.3.2 Adjusted recognition rates and decisions per inhabitant

As a final step, it was examined whether countries with high (adjusted) recognition rates receive relatively few asylum seekers, which could indicate that they are discouraging asylum applications more than other countries are. As an indicator of the relative number of asylum seekers, it was calculated how many first instance decisions were taken in a country in 2014 (both positive and negative) per 1,000 inhabitants. The adjusted recognition rates in Figure 5 pertain to all positive first instance decisions; the rates in Figure 6 pertain to positive first instance decisions on international grounds. The figures also include the (tentative) estimates for countries that reached fewer than 500 decisions in 2014.


It turns out that in both cases there is actually a positive relationship between the relative number of asylum seekers and countries' (adjusted) recognition rates. Countries with high (adjusted) recognition rates tend to receive more, not fewer, asylum applications per inhabitant than countries with lower recognition rates. This does not support the hypothesis that countries can 'afford' to have high recognition rates because they are discouraging asylum applications. In fact, it seems more probable that countries with high recognition rates are relatively attractive to asylum seekers. This is in line with Neumayer's (2004) findings, which show that countries with high recognition rates tend to receive a relatively high share of all asylum applications submitted in Europe, which, in his analysis, is a result of asylum seekers (or human smugglers') interest in applying for asylum where admission chances are believed to be high. Other explanations for this pattern are also conceivable, however.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> It could be, for instance, that countries receiving many asylum seekers have more resources to professionalise their admission procedures, for example by hiring specialists who obtain an in-depth knowledge of the problems asylum seekers are facing in their respective countries of origin, leading to higher overall recognition rates.

**Figure 5 Decisions per 1,000 inhabitants and adjusted recognition rates (Model 3, recognitions on international and national grounds)**



**Figure 6 Decisions per 1,000 inhabitants and adjusted recognition rates (Model 6, recognitions on international grounds only)**





### 3 Conclusion

There are large international differences in the percentage of asylum requests that states recognise. In the EU/EFTA area in 2014, the percentage of positive first instance decisions varied from 9% in Hungary to 94% in Bulgaria. This led to political discussions in the Netherlands about the causes of these international differences in general, and the position of the Netherlands compared to other European countries in particular. This study uses a statistical method to (a) estimate recognition rates by country of asylum, net of international differences in the composition of their asylum seeker population with respect to country of origin, age and sex, and (b) to calculate expected recognition rates for each country, given its unique asylum population, but based on the assumption that its decisions are in line with the decision outcomes in the EU/EFTA area as a whole for the kinds of asylum seekers that the country receives.

It is found that international differences in recognition rates become considerably smaller after adjusting for composition effects. At the same time, substantial differences persist, especially – but not exclusively – when positive decisions on national grounds count as recognitions. When only the positive decisions on international grounds – i.e., on the basis of the ‘Geneva convention’ or the ECHR – count as recognitions, it is still found that countries with the highest adjusted recognition rates would, when making all the first instance decisions in the EU/EFTA in 2014, recognise approximately twice as many asylum applications than countries with the lowest adjusted recognition rates.

Net of the effects of international differences in asylum seekers’ origin, age and sex, the Netherlands no longer has a relatively high recognition rate, and actually emerges as a relatively ‘restrictive’ European country. It is estimated to have reached a positive decision in 39% of the cases, had it made all first instance decisions on the asylum requests that the 30 EU/EFTA countries dealt with in 2014, while the European average was 47%. Based on the average decision patterns in Europe, the Netherlands is expected to have reached between 800 and 1,000 additional positive decisions (depending on whether positive decisions on national grounds in the EU/EFTA area are counted as rejections or as recognitions). The decrease of the recognition rate when keeping origin, age and sex effects constant indicates that a relatively large share of asylum seekers in the Netherlands indeed had characteristics that were associated with a high probability of a positive decision in the EU/EFTA as a whole in 2014 (such as Syrian asylum seekers). On the basis of the analyses, it cannot be established why the Netherlands was dealing with an asylum seeker population with relatively high recognition chances.

Compared to looking at unadjusted rates, comparing adjusted recognition rates (or comparing observed and expected recognition rates) is a better way of assessing countries’ relative willingness to admit asylum seekers. However, the adjusted and expected rates still provide suggestive rather than definitive evidence on how (un)restrictive countries are in their admission decisions. These rates should primarily be used to ask additional questions on the lack of international convergence that remains. What could explain the high adjusted rates in country X? What explains the low rates of country Y if they are not due to the compositional differences that are accounted for? The scientific literature suggests that international differences in willingness to admit asylum seekers play a substantial role, for example in connection with international differences in unemployment, or differences in the popularity (and political influence) of anti-immigration parties (Neumayer, 2005). Additionally, there may well be certain procedural explanations

(such as the *Duldung* system in Germany, see the introduction). It therefore seems advisable to perform a comparative study on similarities and differences between asylum procedures in the EU/EFTA area.

Several methodological limitations should be taken into consideration and the findings should be interpreted with some caution (the main limitations were mentioned in the introduction). Two limitations were overcome to some extent by conducting explorative additional analyses. Firstly, no support was found for the hypothesis that international differences in the outcome of first instance decisions are systematically repaired at later stages of the asylum procedure: the chances of a positive final decision after a first instance rejection are relatively low in most countries, and there is no evidence that countries with low (adjusted) recognition rates in the first instance eventually accept an extraordinarily high number of asylum seekers due to successful appeals or repeated asylum applications. This finding confirms previous research conducted on regional variation in first instance decision outcomes in the Netherlands (Mascini, 2002), and underscores the importance of the first instance decisions. Secondly, no evidence was found that countries with the highest (adjusted) recognition rates receive fewer asylum seekers, which could indicate that they may be discouraging asylum applications more than other countries. Quite to the contrary, it turns out that countries with high (adjusted) recognition rates tend to receive more, not fewer, asylum applications per inhabitant. A possible explanation for this pattern is that asylum seekers try to apply for asylum in countries with relatively high (perceived) admission chances (cf. Neumayer, 2004). This observation, too, confirms that first instance recognition rates matter, and that it is important to optimize the comparability of these rates by calculating 'adjusted' and/or 'expected' recognition rates, using the available information on asylum seekers' nationality, age and sex.



## Samenvatting

### Hoe streng (of soepel) zijn we? 'Gecorrigeerde' en 'verwachte' inwilligingspercentages asiel in Europa

#### Aanleiding

Er zijn tussen Europese landen grote verschillen in het percentage asielverzoeken dat overheden inwilligen. Van alle eerste aanleg beslissingen<sup>17</sup> die staten in het EU/EFTA gebied in 2014 namen, ging het om 47% van de gevallen om een inwilliging, variërend van 9% voor Hongarije tot 94% voor Bulgarije (Eurostat cijfers per 14 mei 2015, cijfers kunnen door latere updates iets verschillen). Nederland willigde 67% van de verzoeken in, wat het in 2014 de zesde plaats opleverde in termen van het hoogste percentage inwilligingen (na Bulgarije, Zweden, Cyprus, Malta en Zwitserland). Het relatief hoge percentage inwilligingen in Nederland is aanleiding geweest voor diverse vragen uit de Tweede Kamer over de achtergronden van de internationale verschillen in die percentages in het algemeen en het relatief hoge percentage voor Nederland in het bijzonder. Vanuit het Nederlandse kabinet is onder meer aangegeven dat de percentages moeilijk met elkaar vergeleken kunnen worden omdat elk land te maken heeft met een verschillende samenstelling van de asielpopulatie. Door de Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie is onder andere de hypothese opgeworpen dat Nederland een hoog inwilligingspercentage heeft doordat de 'korte' Nederlandse asielprocedure relatief kansrijke asielzoekers zou aantrekken. In dit onderzoek wordt nagegaan of het relatief hoge Nederlandse inwilligingspercentage inderdaad komt doordat er relatief veel mensen in Nederland asiel aanvragen die (gegeven hun herkomstland, leeftijd en geslacht) ook in andere Europese landen een grote kans op een positieve beslissing zouden hebben.

Drie onderzoeksvragen stonden centraal in deze studie:

- 8 In hoeverre zijn er internationale verschillen in inwilligingspercentages wanneer de samenstelling van de asielpopulatie wat betreft herkomstland, leeftijd en geslacht constant wordt gehouden?
- 9 Wat is de positie van Nederland wanneer dergelijke compositie-effecten constant worden gehouden?
- 10 Wat is het *verwachte* inwilligingspercentage van een land wanneer elke asielzoeker er precies die kans op inwilliging had gehad die hij of zij – gegeven zijn of haar nationaliteit, leeftijd en geslacht – gemiddeld zou hebben gehad in het EU/EFTA-gebied als geheel?

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<sup>17</sup> Eurostat definieert eerste aanleg beslissingen ('first instance decisions') als volgt: 'beslissingen (positief en negatief) ten aanzien van verzoeken tot internationale bescherming en een verblijfsvergunning op humanitaire gronden (...)'(vertaling door de auteur). Deze worden onderscheiden van de definitieve beslissingen ("final decisions"): 'beslissingen door overheidsorganen of rechtelijke instanties in beroep of herziening waartegen geen verder beroep mogelijk is (...)'(vertaling door de auteur). Het is enigszins onduidelijk wat er precies onder de definitieve beslissingen valt, gezien de volgende toevoeging in de 'metadata' door Eurostat: '[I]t is not intended that asylum statistics should cover rare or exceptional cases determined by the highest courts. Thus, the statistics related to the final decisions should refer to what is effectively a final decision in the vast majority of all cases: i.e. that all normal routes of appeal have been exhausted.'

## Gecorrigeerde en verwachte inwilligingspercentages

In dit onderzoek zijn statistische technieken gebruikt waarmee de inwilligingspercentages van landen beter met elkaar kunnen worden vergeleken. Ten eerste worden er *gecorrigeerde* inwilligingspercentages ('adjusted recognition rates') gepresenteerd. Het gecorrigeerde inwilligingspercentage is het geschatte percentage inwilligingen in een land indien elk EU/EFTA-land te maken zou hebben gehad met precies dezelfde samenstelling van de asielpopulatie in termen van land van herkomst, leeftijd en geslacht (andere kenmerken van asielzoekers worden niet door Eurostat geregistreerd en konden derhalve niet in de analyse worden meegenomen). Die situatie is nagebootst door te berekenen wat het inwilligingspercentage van een land was geweest – gezien de uitkomsten van zijn beslissingen in vergelijking met de uitkomsten van soortgelijke beslissingen in andere landen – indien dat land verantwoordelijk was geweest voor alle beslissingen die in 2014 in het gehele EU/EFTA-gebied werden genomen. Ten tweede worden er *verwachte* inwilligingspercentages ('expected recognition rates') gepresenteerd. Het verwachte inwilligingspercentage geeft het percentage inwilligingen in een land als het land de asielverzoeken die het kreeg precies zo zou hebben afgedaan als voor asielzoekers met dergelijke kenmerken (afgemeten aan de nationaliteit, leeftijd en geslacht van de aanvragers) gemiddeld het geval was in het EU/EFTA-gebied als geheel. Er zijn aparte analyses gedaan voor de kans op een *inwilliging inclusief inwilligingen op nationale gronden* en voor de kans op een *inwilliging op internationale gronden* ('Geneve', 'EVRM'). Er zijn ook aparte analyses verricht voor 2013, maar omdat de resultaten vrij veel overeenkomst vertoonden met 2014 zijn alleen de bevindingen voor 2014 gerapporteerd.<sup>18</sup> Twee EU/EFTA-landen werden niet meegenomen in de analyse. Oostenrijk had nog geen cijfers over 2014 beschikbaar gesteld en Liechtenstein kon niet worden meegenomen vanwege een te gering aantal asielbeslissingen.

## Bredere relevantie

Hoewel de analyses zijn verricht naar aanleiding van de Nederlandse vragen uit de Tweede Kamer, hebben de gebruikte technieken en resultaten een bredere relevantie. Zowel politici als wetenschappers zien het inwilligingspercentage als de beste indicator voor de bereidheid van landen om asielverzoeken te honoreren, maar deze inwilligingspercentages worden uiteraard ook beïnvloed door andere factoren, waaronder het aandeel asielzoekers uit landen met een hoge of juist lage kans op inwilliging. Wanneer de invloed van die andere variabelen – voor zover geregistreerd en door Eurostat beschikbaar gesteld – statistisch constant wordt gehouden, ontstaan betere indicatoren. De resultaten en toegepaste methoden zouden in de toekomst bijvoorbeeld gebruikt kunnen worden om te monitoren of Europese landen asielverzoeken ongeveer op dezelfde wijze behandelen, en om eventueel nader onderzoek te doen naar de achtergronden van nog resterende internationale verschillen in

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<sup>18</sup> The dertig EU/EFTA landen hebben elk een rangnummer (van 1 tot 30) op basis van het (finale) gecorrigeerde inwilligingspercentage. Die rangnummers zijn ontleend aan de 'odds ratios' in model 3 en 6 (zie *appendix 2*). Figuur 1 en 2 tonen de rangorde wanneer acht 'kleinere' landen (met minder dan 500 eerste aanleg beslissingen in 2014) buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. Deze rangordes zijn ook berekend voor 2013. Vervolgens is de (Spearman) correlatie berekend tussen de rangorde voor 2013 en 2014. Die correlaties blijken respectievelijk 0,74 (alle positieve beslissingen) and 0,76 (positieve beslissingen op internationale gronden) te bedragen. Dat geldt als een sterke samenhang en wijst uit dat de positie van landen weliswaar enigszins varieert van jaar tot jaar, maar dat de rangorde niet fundamenteel verandert, althans niet in een dergelijke korte tijdspanne.

inwilligingskansen. Er zijn in de Europese Unie weliswaar tendensen tot centralisering waarneembaar (gezien de noodmaatregelen om een deel van de asielzoekers uit Griekenland, Italië en Hongarije elders in de EU te hervestigen), maar het is de vraag of het bestaande systeem, waarin elk land de asielaanvragen beoordeelt die in zijn grondgebied worden ingediend, fundamenteel zal veranderen.

## Resultaten

De internationale verschillen in inwilligingspercentages blijken kleiner te worden wanneer ze worden bijgesteld voor compositie-effecten. Vooral verschillen tussen landen in de samenstelling van de asielbevolking naar herkomstland blijken van belang te zijn; het blijkt relatief weinig uit te maken of er daar bovenop wordt gecorrigeerd voor leeftijd en geslacht. Er blijven echter substantiële verschillen bestaan, vooral – maar niet uitsluitend – wanneer ook de positieve beslissingen op nationale gronden tot de inwilligingen worden gerekend. Wanneer er specifiek wordt gekeken naar de kans op een inwilliging op internationale gronden, blijken de EU/EFTA-landen met het hoogste (gecorrigeerde) inwilligingspercentages naar schatting nog altijd ongeveer twee keer zoveel asielverzoeken in te willigen dan de landen met de laagste (gecorrigeerde) inwilligingspercentages.

Wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden met internationale verschillen in de samenstelling van asielbevolking (naar nationaliteit, leeftijd en geslacht) blijkt Nederland eerder een relatief restrictief dan een relatief permissief land te zijn. Wanneer Nederland in 2014 alle toenmalige eerste aanleg beslissingen in de EU/EFTA ruimte had genomen, was naar schatting 39% van de asielverzoeken ingewilligd, terwijl het gemiddelde percentage inwilligingen in de EU/EFTA landen, zoals gezegd, 47% bedroeg. Wanneer er alleen wordt gekeken naar inwilligingen op internationale gronden, scoort Nederland eveneens onder het Europese gemiddelde. Er waren dan naar schatting tien EU/EFTA landen geweest (van de 30 EU/EFTA landen waarnaar gekeken kon worden) die minder asielverzoeken zouden hebben ingewilligd. Vaak gaat het dan om Oost-Europese landen die nog niet zo lang deel uitmaken van de Europese Unie en waar de asielinstroom relatief laag is. Van de 22 'grote' landen die in 2014 ten minste 500 eerste aanleg beslissingen namen had Nederland het op zes na laagste gecorrigeerde inwilligingspercentage op internationale gronden – lager dan het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Denemarken, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Zweden, en Italië (zie ook figuur 1 en 2).

Dat het gecorrigeerde inwilligingspercentage voor Nederland een stuk lager lag dan het daadwerkelijke ('ongecorrigeerde') inwilligingspercentage suggereert dat Nederland, zoals het Nederlandse kabinet al veronderstelde, relatief veel asielverzoeken afhandelde die betrekking hadden op asielzoekers uit landen die ook in andere EU/EFTA landen een relatief hoge inwilligingskans hadden (en die tevens, zo blijkt uit de analyse, op grond van hun leeftijd en/of geslacht een verhoogde kans op toelating hadden). De analyses kunnen geen inzicht geven in de vraag waarom Nederland te maken had met een relatief kansrijke asielbevolking.

Soortgelijke bevindingen komen naar voren indien er wordt gekeken naar de *verwachte* inwilligingspercentages. Die blijken voor Nederland 72% (inclusief inwilligingen op nationale gronden) en 67% (uitsluitend inwilligingen op internationale gronden) te bedragen, terwijl de feitelijke Nederlandse inwilligingspercentages uitkwamen op respectievelijk 67% en 63%. (Nederland heeft de nationale erkeningsgronden afgeschaft, maar volgens Eurostat werden er in 2014 nog steeds asielverzoeken op nationale gronden ingewilligd; navraag bij de IND leerde dat het gaat om inwilligingen op grond van artikel 29, tweede lid, van de Vreemdelingenwet

2000 en, in mindere mate, om inwillingen op grond van artikel 29, eerste lid).<sup>19</sup> Volgens het statistisch model wees Nederland circa duizend (958) personen af die wel waren toegelaten op internationale dan wel nationale gronden indien ze – conform de huidige verdeling van de asielbevolking – willekeurig over de EU/EFTA ruimte waren verdeeld en daar door de desbetreffende EU/EFTA landen waren beoordeeld. Naar schatting hadden circa achthonderd in Nederland afgewezen asielzoekers (785) in dat geval internationale bescherming gekregen.

## Beperkingen

Er moet met enkele beperkingen rekening worden gehouden bij de beoordeling van de resultaten. Ten eerste is dit soort statistisch onderzoek uiteraard afhankelijk van de kwaliteit (juistheid, volledigheid, vergelijkbaarheid) van de administratieve gegevens die beschikbaar zijn gesteld. Er is geen nader onderzoek gedaan naar de kwaliteit van de Eurostat gegevens. Wel is er vanuit de IND en EASO aangegeven dat er de afgelopen jaren stappen zijn gezet om die kwaliteit te vergroten (voor Nederland zouden inmiddels gegevens over 'nareizigers' uit de cijfers voor 2013 en 2014 zijn gehaald (zie noot 3)). Het lijkt er echter op dat er nog meer stappen gezet zouden kunnen worden, bijvoorbeeld door (1) aparte gegevens ter beschikking te stellen over de afdoening van *eerste* asielverzoeken, en door (2) alle niet-ontvankelijke asielaanvragen buiten beschouwing te laten (niet alleen van personen die in een ander 'Dublin'-land zijn afgewezen, zoals momenteel dient te gebeuren. Om technische redenen is het voor Nederland overigens nog niet mogelijk om gegevens over Dublin-zaken buiten beschouwing te laten. Dit kan hebben geleid tot een zekere overschatting van de 'strengheid' van Nederland: de Nederlandse gegevens voor 2014 bevatten immers afwijzingen betreffende Dublin-zaken die in andere landen wellicht al wel buiten beschouwing zijn gelaten. De precieze omvang daarvan kan pas worden bepaald als er gegevens zijn over het aantal negatieve beslissingen in Nederland betreffende personen die in een 'Dublin'-land zijn afgewezen. Een tweede belangrijke beperking is dat de samenstelling van de asielbevolking van land tot land in meer opzichten kan hebben verschild dan op nationaliteit, leeftijd en geslacht. Het zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen zijn dat Irakezen die in Zweden asiel aanvroegen afkomstig waren uit andere regio's of uit andere groepen dan Irakezen die in Griekenland om bescherming verzochten en dat Irakezen die in Griekenland werden afgewezen ook in Zweden waren afgewezen. Dit zogeheten probleem van 'ongeobserveerde heterogeniteit' zou verminderd kunnen worden als er meer relevante kenmerken geregistreerd zouden worden, bijvoorbeeld de regio van herkomst of de etniciteit van de asielzoeker. Het kan alleen volledig worden weggenomen indien er een experiment gestart zou worden waarbij asielverzoeken willekeurig ter beoordeling over Europese landen zouden worden verdeeld – mits landen dan allemaal dezelfde beslissingen zouden nemen als wanneer er geen sprake was geweest van een dergelijk (politiek wellicht nogal gevoelig) experiment. De huidige bevindingen geven dus geen definitief inzicht in internationale verschillen in inwilligingsgeneigdheid, maar dienen vooral om nadere vragen te formuleren over verschillen die niet verklaard kunnen worden door de gemeten compositie-effecten.

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<sup>19</sup> Volgens de IND gaat het om na- of meereizigers die een zelfstandige asielaanvraag indienen en vervolgens een 'afgeleide' vergunning krijgen die onder *humanitarian status* valt. Volgens de IND dienen dergelijke asielaanvragen volgens de Eurostat-regels meegerekend te worden. Daarnaast heeft de IND aangegeven dat het van ambtshalve verlenen van vergunningen is ingegaan op 1 april 2014. In circa tweederde van de gevallen gaat het bij de *positive decisions* met *humanitarian status* om inwillingen op grond van art. 29, tweede lid; circa een derde (tot 1 april 2014) betreft inwillingen op grond van art. 29, eerste lid.

De wetenschappelijke literatuur suggereert dat de dan nog resterende verschillen voor een belangrijk deel verband houden met internationale verschillen in de bereidheid om asielzoekers op te nemen – bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van verschillen tussen landen in werkloosheidspercentages en/of de houding van de bevolking ten aanzien van (asiel)migratie (Neumanyer, 2005). Daarnaast kunnen ze voortkomen uit juridische, procedurele verschillen tussen landen. In Duitsland wordt bijvoorbeeld vrij veel gebruikgemaakt van *Duldung*, een soort tijdelijke gedoogstatus die formeel niet als verblijfsvergunning geldt, waardoor personen formeel worden afgewezen die feitelijk een zekere bescherming genieten en elders misschien een asielvergunning zouden krijgen (Morris, 2001). Ook verkleint de Nederlandse procedure wellicht het aantal negatieve inwillingen in eerste aanleg doordat de IND eerst een 'voornemen' communiceert waartegen de asielzoeker zijn of haar 'zienswijze' kan stellen. Dit heeft als mogelijk gevolg dat gevallen die in andere landen wellicht zouden leiden tot een negatieve eerste aanleg beslissing, waarop dan eventueel een beroep volgt, in Nederland uitmonden in een inwilliging in eerste aanleg (wanneer de IND meegaat in de zienswijze van de asielzoeker). Dit leidt potentieel tot een zekere onderschatting van de 'strengheid' van Nederland in de eerste aanleg beslissingen. Het zou goed zijn als er een internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek gedaan zou worden naar de overeenkomsten en verschillen in asielprocedures in het EU/EFTA-gebied.

Twee andere beperkingen konden in het kader van dit onderzoek gedeeltelijk worden weggenomen door middel van aanvullende verkennende analyses. Ten eerste is gekeken of landen die in eerste aanleg zeer restrictief zijn uiteindelijk een vergelijkbaar aantal personen bescherming bieden, doordat afgewezen asielzoekers in veel gevallen met succes in beroep gaan. Er zijn geen aanwijzingen gevonden dat de internationale verschillen in de uitkomst van eerste aanleg beslissingen in latere fases van de asielprocedure worden gerepareerd. Die bevinding is overigens in lijn met de conclusies van onderzoek dat eerder in Nederland is gedaan naar *regionale* verschillen in de afdoening van asielverzoeken (Mascini, 2002). Het onderstreept het belang van de beslissingen die in eerste aanleg worden genomen. Ten tweede is gekeken of landen met een hoog (gecorrigeerd) inwilligingspercentage wellicht te maken hebben met een relatief klein aantal asielverzoeken, wat er mogelijk op zou kunnen wijzen dat zij in werkelijkheid juist zeer restrictief zijn omdat zij het indienen van asiel meer zouden ontmoedigen dan andere landen, waardoor zij de weinigen die overblijven gemakkelijk kunnen toelaten. Ook hiervoor zijn geen aanwijzingen gevonden. Integendeel: landen met hoge (gecorrigeerde) inwilligingspercentages blijken per inwoner juist veel asielaanvragen te krijgen (afgemeten aan het aantal beslissingen in 2014). Een mogelijke verklaring voor dat patroon is dat mensen asiel proberen aan te vragen in een land waar de kans op een inwilliging relatief hoog is (zie ook Neumayer, 2004). Ook die waarneming onderstreept het belang van de internationale verschillen in de kans op een inwilliging in eerste aanleg én van het optimaal benutten van de administratieve gegevens die iets zeggen over die kans.



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## Appendix 1 Methodology

All recognition rates presented in Chapter 2 are based on logistic regression models. The rates were calculated using the following steps:

- 1 Data on all first instance decisions in 2014 were taken from Eurostat, and are based on the 14-05-2015 update. The decisions can (with some effort) be broken down by various dimensions simultaneously, i.e., first by country of asylum, then by country of citizenship of the asylum seeker, then by age category ('Less than 14 years', 'From 14 to 17 years', 'From 18 to 34 years', 'From 35 to 64 years', '65 years or over', and 'Unknown'), then by sex ('Males', 'Females', and 'Unknown'), and then by decision outcome ('Geneva Convention status', 'Subsidiary protection status', 'Humanitarian status', and 'Rejected'). It could thus be established, as an example, that 65 Cameroonian females aged 18 to 34 were rejected in the first instance in Belgium in 2014. The data were downloaded separately for 'Males', 'Females', and 'Unknown [sex]', as Eurostat interface allows only four dimensions to be shown simultaneously. No data on first instance decisions in 2014 were available yet for Austria.
- 2 In a limited number of cases, Eurostat gave small negative numbers (-5, -10) when the data were broken down by the five dimensions mentioned. These were all set to 0. It also turned out that the total number of decisions after the data were broken down by the five dimensions as described did not completely add up to the number of decisions in the EU/EFTA countries if the data were not broken down (this is probably due to Eurostat's practice of rounding all numbers to the nearest 5). It turned out that the variables 'age' and 'sex' were mostly responsible for the 'missing' decisions. This was solved by adding decisions to the downloaded database with age and gender coded as 'Unknown', until the number of decisions (and the decision outcome) matched the data when decision outcomes were only broken down by country of asylum and country of citizenship. In total, 2.3% of all decisions in the database were 'added' in that way. (If these 2.3% are excluded from the analysis, the results are highly similar to what has been reported.) The number of decisions then still did not add up completely to the number of decisions by country of asylum when decision outcomes are also not broken down by country of citizenship, but that difference was so small that it was not corrected. (According to the 14-5-2014 update the 30 EU/EFTA countries took 388,605 first instance decisions in 2014, so the research database covered 99.96% (388,435/388,605\*100) of all decisions).
- 3 Liechtenstein was excluded from the analysis because the number of (positive) decisions was too small for statistical analysis (10 first instance decisions, all rejections, leading to 'complete separation'). Destination effects also become more difficult to model for countries with relatively homogeneous asylum seeker populations, such as Bulgaria. However, the VIF values (calculated with the collin package for Stata) do not indicate serious multicollinearity issues (all VIF values were 5 or lower (usually approximately 1), with the exception of the dummies 'sex unknown' and 'age unknown'). This indicates that destination effects for individual countries could be estimated reliably. The resulting database included information on 388,435 first instance decisions.
- 4 Six logistic regression models were run in Stata 13 (the coefficients are shown in Appendix 2). In the first three models, the dependent variable was a binary variable based on the Eurostat decision variable, which was recoded as follows: 1 = 'Geneva Convention Status' or 'Subsidiary Protection Status' or 'Humanitarian Status' versus 0 = 'Rejected'. In the final three models, the dependent variable

was coded as follows: 1 = 'Geneva Convention Status' or 'Subsidiary Protection Status' versus 0 = 'Humanitarian Status' or 'Rejected'. All models were what are called no constant models (this eliminated the need to choose an EU/EFTA country as the reference country, which would then function more or less as the 'norm'). In Models 1 and 4, the country of asylum was the only predictor of the decision outcome. In Models 2 and 5, the country of asylum and the country of citizenship of the asylum seeker were the predictors of the decision outcome. In Models 2 and 5, only the effect of country of citizenship ('the origin effect') is held constant throughout the EU/EFTA, and remaining differences in decision outcomes are assumed to be the effect of the country of asylum ('the destination effect') and an error term. Models 3 and 6 follow the same analytical strategy but estimate the destination effect while keeping the origin *and* the sex and age effect constant. The Eurostat figures include a few 'rare' nationalities (such as Canadians and Chileans) where all decisions in EU/EFTA countries were negative. These decisions are automatically excluded from the regression models as the outcome is predicted perfectly (the remaining N is reported in Appendix 2). Using the 'fw' command in Stata, the data were weighted by the number of cases within each unique combination of country of citizenship, age, sex, country of asylum, and decision outcome. For example, there were 14,615 first instance rejections in Italy in 2014, involving 208 unique combinations of country of citizenship, age category and sex (in other words, 208 rows in the database concerned rejections in Italy). By weighting the data, however, the 208 rows (unique combinations of country of citizenship, age category and sex) counted for 14,615 cases in the analysis.

- 5 Using the coefficients obtained in the previous step, it is possible to calculate the chances that a decision would be positive given the characteristics of the asylum seeker, and the country of asylum. For example, the coefficients obtained in Model 2 can be used to calculate the probability that a decision involving an Iranian citizen would be positive in different countries given origin and destination effects. This estimated probability is given by the combination of the coefficient for being an Iranian compared to being an Afghan ( $\ln(0.88)=-0.13$ ), and the coefficient for the EU/EFTA country. For example, there is a 61% chance that a first instance decision in Germany in 2014 involving an Iranian citizen was positive ( $\exp(-0.13+0.57)/(\exp(-0.13+0.57)+1)=0.61$ ). (The coefficient for Germany in Model 2 is  $\ln(1.77)=0.57$ , see Appendix 2). In Greece, there is an estimated 21% chance that a decision involving an Iranian citizen was positive ( $\exp(-0.13+-1.20)/(\exp(-0.13+-1.20)+1)=0.21$ ). (The coefficient for Greece in Model 2 is  $\ln(0.30)=-1.20$ , see Appendix 2). The adjusted recognition rate was calculated in Excel by (1) multiplying the probability of a positive decision in a country for a given category of asylum seekers (say Iranians) by the number of decisions concerning that category (for example, there were 9,155 decisions in the 30 EU/EFTA countries that concerned Iranians, so it is estimated that 5,584 ( $9,155 \times 0.61$ ) decisions involving Iranians would be positive had all decisions be made by Germany), (2) summing these counts for all categories (in case of Model 2: all countries of citizenship; in case of Model 3: all unique combinations of country of citizenship, age and sex), and (3) dividing the sum score for each EU/EFTA country by the number of decisions in the EU/EFTA as a whole (minus the decisions involving 'rare' countries for which all decisions were negative, such as Canada or Chili, which had to be excluded from the models) and (4) multiplying these fractions with 100. The adjusted recognition rates that also correct for the effects of age and sex are calculated in a similar way, with the difference that a larger number of coefficients is used and that different probabilities are calculated for nationals with different demographic

- characteristics (such as the probability that the first instance decision involving an Iranian man in the age category from 18 to 34 years was positive in Germany).
- 6 The expected recognition rates were calculated using models that are similar to Model 3 (positive decisions on international or national grounds) and Model 6 (positive decisions on international grounds only), but that do not include dummies for countries of asylum capturing destination effects (the models also included a constant). The coefficients of country of citizenship, age and sex in these models were used to calculate the probability of a positive decision for each decision taken in country X, given the citizenship, age and sex of the applicant who was involved in the decision, and then summing these probabilities to obtain the expected number of positive decisions for country X as a whole. The coefficients for country of origin, age and sex have not been reported because they were similar to the coefficients in Model 3 and 6.
  - 7 The 95% confidence intervals for the expected recognition rates were calculated using the confidence interval for proportions (taking the expected recognition rate divided by 100 for  $p$ , the total number of first instance decisions as  $n$ , and with  $z=1.96$ ).



## Appendix 2 Coefficients regression models

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>Country of asylum</i>												
Belgium	0.65	0.01	0.64	0.67	1.91	0.05	1.83	2.00	1.35	0.03	1.28	1.41
Bulgaria	17.07	0.87	15.45	18.86	3.22	0.17	2.90	3.57	1.88	0.10	1.70	2.09
Croatia	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.29	0.11	0.13	0.63	0.19	0.09	0.08	0.46
Cyprus	3.23	0.21	2.84	3.67	2.10	0.13	1.87	2.36	1.31	0.08	1.16	1.48
Czech	0.56	0.04	0.50	0.64	3.67	0.34	3.06	4.39	2.73	0.29	2.22	3.35
Denmark	2.10	0.05	2.00	2.20	1.20	0.04	1.12	1.28	0.79	0.03	0.73	0.84
Estonia	0.60	0.20	0.32	1.14	1.43	1.02	0.35	5.76	0.72	0.58	0.15	3.48
Finland	2.03	0.08	1.89	2.19	9.58	0.54	8.57	10.71	2.71	0.14	2.45	3.00
France	0.28	0.00	0.27	0.28	1.55	0.03	1.49	1.62	1.08	0.02	1.03	1.13
Germany	0.71	0.00	0.70	0.72	1.77	0.03	1.70	1.83	1.13	0.02	1.09	1.17
Greece	0.17	0.00	0.16	0.18	0.30	0.01	0.28	0.32	0.21	0.01	0.20	0.23
Hungary	0.10	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.35	0.02	0.31	0.39	0.22	0.01	0.19	0.25
Iceland	0.19	0.05	0.11	0.33	0.35	0.13	0.16	0.73	0.15	0.07	0.06	0.36
Ireland	0.60	0.04	0.53	0.67	3.02	0.23	2.61	3.50	1.60	0.13	1.37	1.88
Italy	1.41	0.02	1.38	1.44	10.16	0.25	9.69	10.65	8.90	0.22	8.48	9.33
Latvia	0.31	0.08	0.19	0.51	0.59	0.09	0.43	0.80	0.22	0.04	0.15	0.33
Lithuania	0.65	0.10	0.48	0.89	4.87	0.83	3.49	6.80	3.02	0.67	1.96	4.66
Luxembourg	0.16	0.02	0.14	0.20	1.03	0.14	0.80	1.34	0.41	0.06	0.30	0.55
Malta	2.69	0.15	2.42	2.99	5.26	0.36	4.61	6.01	3.80	0.27	3.32	4.36
Netherlands	2.01	0.03	1.95	2.07	1.29	0.03	1.22	1.36	0.85	0.02	0.81	0.90
Norway	1.76	0.04	1.68	1.84	1.73	0.06	1.62	1.85	1.09	0.04	1.02	1.17
Poland	0.36	0.02	0.33	0.39	1.88	0.10	1.69	2.09	1.21	0.07	1.09	1.36
Portugal	0.33	0.07	0.22	0.50	2.41	0.55	1.55	3.77	0.89	0.21	0.56	1.39
Romania	0.88	0.04	0.80	0.97	0.47	0.03	0.41	0.55	0.26	0.02	0.23	0.30
Slovakia	1.78	0.23	1.37	2.30	4.35	0.90	2.91	6.52	1.11	0.22	0.75	1.65
Slovenia	0.78	0.18	0.50	1.21	2.23	0.49	1.45	3.41	0.64	0.18	0.38	1.10
Spain	0.78	0.03	0.73	0.83	1.31	0.06	1.20	1.43	0.86	0.04	0.78	0.95
Sweden	3.26	0.04	3.19	3.34	3.10	0.07	2.96	3.24	1.91	0.05	1.82	2.01
Switzerland	2.37	0.04	2.31	2.44	5.51	0.14	5.24	5.79	3.84	0.10	3.65	4.05
UK	0.63	0.01	0.61	0.64	1.40	0.03	1.34	1.47	0.91	0.02	0.86	0.95

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>Country of citizenship</i>												
Afghanistan (ref)												
Albania	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.04
Algeria	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.05
Angola	0.17	0.01	0.15	0.20	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.14
Armenia	0.08	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.06
Azerbaijan	0.13	0.01	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.11
Bahrain	5.86	2.69	2.38	14.42	4.42	1.97	1.84	10.60	4.42	1.97	1.84	10.60
Bangladesh	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.07
Belarus	0.15	0.02	0.12	0.18	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.15	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.15
Benin	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.08
Bhutan	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.15	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.15
Bolivia	0.15	0.04	0.09	0.25	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.10	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.10
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02
Brazil	0.12	0.03	0.07	0.20	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.11
British overseas countries and territories	1.43	0.78	0.49	4.18	0.57	0.28	0.22	1.47	0.57	0.28	0.22	1.47
Bulgaria	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02
Burkina Faso	0.09	0.01	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.01	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.01	0.07	0.11
Burundi	0.23	0.03	0.17	0.30	0.18	0.03	0.13	0.24	0.18	0.03	0.13	0.24
Cambodia	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.23	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.13	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.13
Cameroon	0.19	0.01	0.17	0.22	0.19	0.01	0.17	0.22	0.19	0.01	0.17	0.22
Central African Republic	7.94	1.32	5.73	11.00	8.38	1.43	5.99	11.71	8.38	1.43	5.99	11.71
Chad	0.15	0.02	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.02	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.02	0.12	0.19
China (including Hong Kong)	0.31	0.01	0.29	0.32	0.31	0.01	0.29	0.33	0.31	0.01	0.29	0.33
Colombia	0.23	0.03	0.18	0.28	0.17	0.02	0.13	0.22	0.17	0.02	0.13	0.22
Comoros	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.11	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.10
Congo	0.14	0.01	0.12	0.17	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.14
Cuba	0.21	0.03	0.16	0.29	0.15	0.02	0.11	0.21	0.15	0.02	0.11	0.21
Côte d'Ivoire	0.18	0.01	0.16	0.20	0.18	0.01	0.16	0.20	0.18	0.01	0.16	0.20
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.16	0.01	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.00	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.00	0.13	0.14
Djibouti	0.47	0.07	0.36	0.62	0.37	0.05	0.28	0.48	0.37	0.05	0.28	0.48

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Dominican Republic				0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
Ecuador				0.36	0.11	0.20	0.65		0.21	0.05	0.13	0.34
Egypt				0.22	0.01	0.20	0.24		0.20	0.01	0.18	0.22
El Salvador				0.12	0.02	0.09	0.16		0.08	0.01	0.06	0.11
Eritrea				3.80	0.11	3.59	4.02		4.43	0.13	4.17	4.69
Ethiopia				0.41	0.02	0.37	0.45		0.36	0.02	0.33	0.40
Macedonia				0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Gabon				0.05	0.03	0.02	0.14		0.03	0.01	0.01	0.07
Gambia, The				0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07		0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07
Georgia				0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04		0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03
Ghana				0.06	0.00	0.05	0.07		0.06	0.00	0.05	0.07
Guatemala				0.24	0.10	0.10	0.56		0.09	0.03	0.04	0.19
Guinea				0.26	0.01	0.24	0.28		0.24	0.01	0.22	0.25
Guinea-Bissau				0.05	0.01	0.04	0.07		0.06	0.01	0.05	0.07
Haiti				0.04	0.00	0.04	0.05		0.05	0.00	0.04	0.06
Honduras				0.23	0.07	0.12	0.41		0.07	0.02	0.04	0.13
India				0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04		0.03	0.00	0.02	0.03
Iran				0.88	0.02	0.83	0.93		0.97	0.03	0.92	1.03
Iraq				1.27	0.03	1.20	1.34		1.28	0.04	1.21	1.35
Jamaica				0.24	0.04	0.17	0.34		0.19	0.04	0.12	0.30
Jordan				0.27	0.04	0.21	0.36		0.18	0.02	0.13	0.23
Kazakhstan				0.15	0.02	0.12	0.19		0.10	0.01	0.08	0.12
Kenya				0.18	0.02	0.14	0.23		0.12	0.02	0.09	0.16
Kosovo				0.06	0.00	0.05	0.06		0.04	0.00	0.04	0.05
Kuwait				0.83	0.24	0.48	1.45		0.71	0.28	0.32	1.55
Kyrgyzstan				0.13	0.02	0.10	0.17		0.10	0.01	0.08	0.13
Lebanon				0.09	0.01	0.07	0.10		0.06	0.01	0.05	0.08
Liberia				0.10	0.01	0.07	0.13		0.09	0.01	0.07	0.12
Libya				0.43	0.02	0.38	0.48		0.40	0.02	0.36	0.45

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Madagascar					0.07	0.02	0.03	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.09
Malawi					0.09	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.12
Malaysia					0.32	0.11	0.17	0.63	0.20	0.07	0.10	0.40
Mali					0.10	0.00	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.10	0.12
Mauritania					0.16	0.01	0.14	0.18	0.16	0.01	0.14	0.18
Mauritius					0.03	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.05
Mexico					0.06	0.03	0.02	0.16	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05
Moldova					0.07	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05
Mongolia					0.05	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04
Montenegro					0.02	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Morocco					0.04	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.04
Myanmar/Burma					0.23	0.02	0.18	0.28	0.24	0.03	0.19	0.30
Nepal					0.04	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05
Niger					0.10	0.01	0.07	0.13	0.11	0.02	0.08	0.16
Nigeria					0.07	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.07	0.07
North Korea					0.22	0.04	0.15	0.32	0.14	0.03	0.09	0.22
Pakistan					0.13	0.00	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.00	0.13	0.15
Palestine					1.37	0.12	1.16	1.62	1.34	0.13	1.12	1.61
Peru					0.11	0.03	0.07	0.19	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.10
Philippines					0.06	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05
Romania					0.04	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04
Russia					0.18	0.01	0.17	0.19	0.14	0.00	0.13	0.14
Rwanda					0.40	0.03	0.34	0.47	0.32	0.03	0.27	0.37
Saudi Arabia					0.51	0.15	0.29	0.92	0.24	0.07	0.13	0.43
Senegal					0.08	0.00	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.00	0.08	0.09
Serbia					0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Sierra Leone					0.20	0.02	0.17	0.24	0.17	0.02	0.14	0.21
Somalia					0.80	0.02	0.76	0.84	0.81	0.02	0.76	0.85
South Africa					0.03	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04
South Korea					0.28	0.09	0.15	0.54	0.10	0.04	0.05	0.23
South Sudan					0.06	0.03	0.03	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.11



	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]			
Sri Lanka				0.40	0.01	0.38	0.43	0.41	0.01	0.39	0.44	
Sudan				0.58	0.02	0.54	0.63	0.70	0.03	0.64	0.75	
Swaziland				0.35	0.17	0.13	0.88	0.25	0.17	0.07	0.91	
Syria				10.27	0.25	9.79	10.77	11.74	0.30	11.16	12.34	
Tajikistan				0.13	0.03	0.09	0.20	0.10	0.02	0.06	0.15	
Tanzania				0.08	0.02	0.04	0.14	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.07	
Thailand				0.32	0.17	0.11	0.90	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.26	
Togo				0.18	0.01	0.15	0.21	0.17	0.01	0.14	0.20	
Trinidad and Tobago				0.14	0.07	0.05	0.38	0.10	0.06	0.03	0.34	
Tunisia				0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	
Turkey				0.16	0.01	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.01	0.15	0.17	
Turkmenistan				0.43	0.13	0.23	0.79	0.14	0.05	0.07	0.30	
Uganda				0.63	0.05	0.54	0.73	0.65	0.05	0.55	0.76	
Ukraine				0.08	0.00	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.07	
United States				0.06	0.02	0.03	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.08	
Uzbekistan				0.12	0.01	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.10	
Venezuela				0.10	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.08	
Vietnam				0.09	0.01	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.10	
Western Sahara				0.30	0.04	0.24	0.39	0.35	0.05	0.27	0.46	
Yemen				0.34	0.04	0.28	0.42	0.22	0.03	0.17	0.28	
Zambia				0.32	0.12	0.16	0.65	0.22	0.06	0.12	0.38	
Zimbabwe				0.22	0.03	0.18	0.29	0.19	0.02	0.15	0.25	
Stateless				3.42	0.13	3.19	3.68	3.75	0.14	3.48	4.04	
Unknown				0.96	0.03	0.89	1.03	0.91	0.03	0.85	0.98	
<b>Age</b>												
From 18 to 34 years (ref)												
Less than 14 years								1.49	0.08	1.34	1.66	
From 14 to 17 years								3.42	0.08	3.27	3.57	
From 35 to 64 years								1.12	0.01	1.09	1.15	
65 years or over								2.44	0.04	2.37	2.51	
Unknown								1.11	0.11	0.92	1.34	

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>Sex</i>												
Males (ref)												
Females									1.43	0.02	1.40	1.46
Unknown									7.16	0.74	5.84	8.77
N	388,340				387,760				387,760			
Correctly classified	67.9%				83.3%				84.4%			
Efron pseudo r2	0.17				0.52				0.54			

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>Country of asylum</i>												
Belgium	0.65	0.01	0.64	0.67	1.41	0.03	1.35	1.48	1.17	0.03	1.11	1.22
Bulgaria	17.07	0.87	15.45	18.86	2.96	0.15	2.67	3.27	2.15	0.11	1.95	2.38
Croatia	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.22	0.08	0.10	0.45	0.16	0.07	0.07	0.38
Cyprus	3.23	0.21	2.84	3.67	1.81	0.11	1.60	2.05	1.37	0.09	1.21	1.55
Czech	0.54	0.04	0.47	0.62	2.42	0.22	2.01	2.90	2.07	0.21	1.70	2.52
Denmark	1.99	0.05	1.90	2.08	0.87	0.03	0.82	0.93	0.69	0.02	0.65	0.74
Estonia	0.60	0.20	0.32	1.14	1.09	0.74	0.29	4.12	0.69	0.53	0.15	3.12
Finland	1.38	0.05	1.28	1.47	3.89	0.23	3.47	4.37	1.71	0.09	1.53	1.90
France	0.28	0.00	0.27	0.28	1.07	0.02	1.02	1.11	0.88	0.02	0.84	0.91
Germany	0.65	0.00	0.64	0.66	1.11	0.02	1.08	1.15	0.86	0.02	0.83	0.89
Greece	0.16	0.00	0.15	0.17	0.21	0.01	0.20	0.23	0.18	0.01	0.17	0.19
Hungary	0.10	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.28	0.02	0.25	0.31	0.21	0.01	0.19	0.24
Iceland	0.19	0.05	0.11	0.33	0.23	0.09	0.10	0.51	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.32
Ireland	0.60	0.04	0.53	0.67	2.16	0.16	1.86	2.50	1.45	0.11	1.25	1.69
Italy	0.47	0.01	0.46	0.48	1.86	0.04	1.78	1.94	1.74	0.04	1.67	1.81
Latvia	0.31	0.08	0.19	0.51	0.53	0.08	0.39	0.72	0.29	0.05	0.20	0.41
Lithuania	0.65	0.10	0.48	0.89	3.81	0.63	2.76	5.27	2.77	0.54	1.89	4.05
Luxembourg	0.16	0.02	0.14	0.20	0.79	0.11	0.61	1.04	0.43	0.06	0.32	0.58
Malta	1.73	0.09	1.57	1.91	1.96	0.12	1.74	2.22	1.63	0.11	1.44	1.85

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Netherlands	1.68	0.03	1.63	1.73	0.67	0.02	0.64	0.70	0.54	0.01	0.51	0.57
Norway	1.61	0.04	1.53	1.68	0.99	0.03	0.93	1.06	0.78	0.03	0.73	0.83
Poland	0.19	0.01	0.17	0.21	0.58	0.03	0.52	0.65	0.44	0.03	0.39	0.49
Portugal	0.33	0.07	0.22	0.50	1.92	0.43	1.24	2.98	1.03	0.22	0.67	1.57
Romania	0.88	0.04	0.80	0.97	0.41	0.03	0.36	0.47	0.30	0.02	0.26	0.34
Slovakia	0.61	0.08	0.47	0.79	0.74	0.13	0.52	1.05	0.28	0.06	0.19	0.43
Slovenia	0.78	0.18	0.50	1.21	1.54	0.34	1.00	2.37	0.67	0.17	0.41	1.10
Spain	0.78	0.03	0.73	0.83	1.02	0.04	0.94	1.11	0.81	0.04	0.74	0.88
Sweden	2.74	0.03	2.68	2.81	1.64	0.03	1.58	1.71	1.28	0.03	1.22	1.33
Switzerland	0.67	0.01	0.65	0.69	0.40	0.01	0.38	0.43	0.29	0.01	0.28	0.31
UK	0.54	0.01	0.52	0.55	0.69	0.02	0.66	0.73	0.55	0.01	0.52	0.57
<i>Country of citizenship</i>												
Afghanistan (ref)												
Albania					0.06	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.05
Algeria					0.07	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.08
Angola					0.18	0.01	0.15	0.21	0.14	0.01	0.11	0.16
Armenia					0.07	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.07
Azerbaijan					0.17	0.01	0.15	0.19	0.14	0.01	0.13	0.16
Bahrain					5.43	1.72	2.92	10.11	3.65	1.23	1.88	7.08
Bangladesh					0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.07	0.08
Belarus					0.26	0.03	0.21	0.32	0.22	0.02	0.17	0.27
Benin					0.07	0.01	0.05	0.11	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.11
Bhutan					0.24	0.08	0.12	0.48	0.16	0.06	0.08	0.34
Bolivia					0.10	0.03	0.05	0.19	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.10
Bosnia and Herzegovina					0.03	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03
Brazil					0.12	0.04	0.06	0.24	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.14
British overseas countries and territories					0.72	0.39	0.25	2.11	0.34	0.16	0.13	0.86
Burkina Faso					0.08	0.01	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.10
Burundi					0.32	0.05	0.24	0.43	0.27	0.04	0.20	0.36

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]			
Cambodia				0.13	0.06	0.05	0.34	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.22	
Cameroon				0.28	0.02	0.25	0.32	0.27	0.02	0.24	0.31	
Central African Republic				11.68	1.94	8.44	16.16	11.52	1.94	8.28	16.04	
Chad				0.23	0.03	0.19	0.30	0.23	0.03	0.18	0.29	
China (including Hong Kong)				0.69	0.02	0.65	0.74	0.70	0.02	0.65	0.75	
Colombia				0.43	0.05	0.35	0.55	0.36	0.04	0.28	0.45	
Comoros				0.12	0.01	0.10	0.16	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.15	
Congo				0.20	0.02	0.17	0.24	0.18	0.01	0.15	0.21	
Cuba				0.29	0.05	0.22	0.40	0.22	0.03	0.17	0.30	
Côte d'Ivoire				0.21	0.01	0.19	0.23	0.20	0.01	0.18	0.22	
Democratic Republic of the Congo				0.22	0.01	0.21	0.24	0.19	0.01	0.18	0.21	
Djibouti				0.65	0.09	0.50	0.85	0.56	0.08	0.43	0.73	
Dominican Republic				0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05	
Ecuador				0.14	0.07	0.05	0.37	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.20	
Egypt				0.23	0.01	0.21	0.25	0.20	0.01	0.18	0.22	
El Salvador				0.14	0.03	0.10	0.20	0.10	0.02	0.07	0.14	
Eritrea				8.34	0.22	7.91	8.79	8.81	0.24	8.36	9.29	
Ethiopia				0.64	0.03	0.58	0.70	0.57	0.03	0.52	0.64	
Macedonia				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Gabon				0.11	0.05	0.04	0.29	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.17	
Gambia, The				0.07	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.08	
Georgia				0.04	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.05	
Ghana				0.05	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.06	
Guatemala				0.38	0.15	0.17	0.84	0.18	0.07	0.09	0.36	
Guinea				0.37	0.01	0.34	0.39	0.33	0.01	0.31	0.36	
Guinea-Bissau				0.05	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.07	
Haiti				0.06	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.08	
Honduras				0.33	0.10	0.18	0.61	0.14	0.04	0.08	0.26	
India				0.04	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04	
Iran				1.46	0.04	1.39	1.54	1.52	0.04	1.44	1.61	
Iraq				1.73	0.04	1.64	1.81	1.69	0.04	1.61	1.78	

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Jamaica				0.42	0.08	0.30	0.61		0.36	0.07	0.24	0.53
Jordan				0.39	0.05	0.30	0.51		0.27	0.04	0.21	0.35
Kazakhstan				0.22	0.02	0.18	0.27		0.16	0.02	0.13	0.20
Kenya				0.23	0.03	0.17	0.30		0.16	0.02	0.12	0.22
Kosovo				0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07		0.05	0.00	0.05	0.06
Kuwait				1.59	0.47	0.90	2.84		1.35	0.50	0.66	2.77
Kyrgyzstan				0.21	0.03	0.17	0.27		0.18	0.02	0.14	0.22
Lebanon				0.12	0.01	0.10	0.15		0.10	0.01	0.08	0.12
Liberia				0.09	0.02	0.06	0.14		0.07	0.02	0.05	0.12
Libya				0.61	0.03	0.54	0.68		0.55	0.03	0.50	0.62
Madagascar				0.10	0.03	0.05	0.19		0.08	0.02	0.04	0.14
Malawi				0.10	0.02	0.06	0.16		0.09	0.02	0.06	0.14
Malaysia				0.35	0.14	0.16	0.75		0.22	0.10	0.10	0.53
Mali				0.08	0.00	0.07	0.09		0.08	0.00	0.08	0.09
Mauritania				0.25	0.02	0.22	0.28		0.24	0.02	0.21	0.27
Mauritius				0.06	0.03	0.02	0.16		0.04	0.02	0.02	0.10
Mexico				0.09	0.05	0.04	0.24		0.04	0.02	0.02	0.11
Moldova				0.09	0.02	0.05	0.15		0.05	0.01	0.03	0.09
Mongolia				0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05		0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04
Montenegro				0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02		0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Morocco				0.07	0.01	0.06	0.08		0.07	0.01	0.06	0.08
Myanmar/Burma				0.38	0.04	0.30	0.47		0.38	0.04	0.30	0.47
Nepal				0.06	0.01	0.04	0.10		0.05	0.01	0.03	0.08
Niger				0.16	0.03	0.11	0.22		0.17	0.03	0.12	0.24
Nigeria				0.11	0.00	0.11	0.12		0.11	0.00	0.10	0.11
North Korea				0.30	0.06	0.20	0.44		0.22	0.05	0.14	0.34
Pakistan				0.23	0.01	0.22	0.24		0.24	0.01	0.23	0.25
Palestine				2.14	0.16	1.84	2.49		2.02	0.16	1.72	2.36
Peru				0.15	0.04	0.08	0.26		0.10	0.03	0.06	0.16
Philippines				0.08	0.03	0.04	0.15		0.06	0.02	0.03	0.10

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Russia					0.26	0.01	0.24	0.27	0.21	0.01	0.20	0.22
Rwanda					0.57	0.04	0.49	0.66	0.48	0.04	0.41	0.56
Saudi Arabia					0.97	0.28	0.55	1.71	0.54	0.15	0.31	0.94
Senegal					0.07	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.08
Serbia					0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Sierra Leone					0.24	0.02	0.19	0.29	0.20	0.02	0.16	0.25
Somalia					1.16	0.03	1.11	1.22	1.15	0.03	1.10	1.21
South Africa					0.03	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05
South Sudan					0.48	0.17	0.25	0.95	0.41	0.11	0.24	0.70
Sri Lanka					0.92	0.03	0.87	0.98	0.93	0.03	0.87	0.99
Sudan					0.99	0.04	0.92	1.07	1.07	0.04	0.99	1.16
Swaziland					0.59	0.31	0.21	1.68	0.47	0.31	0.13	1.74
Syria					9.91	0.20	9.52	10.31	10.39	0.22	9.97	10.82
Tajikistan					0.21	0.04	0.14	0.32	0.17	0.04	0.11	0.26
Tanzania					0.09	0.03	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.10
Thailand					0.53	0.28	0.19	1.48	0.21	0.11	0.07	0.61
Togo					0.27	0.03	0.23	0.33	0.27	0.02	0.22	0.32
Trinidad and Tobago					0.29	0.14	0.11	0.76	0.22	0.12	0.07	0.66
Tunisia					0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04
Turkey					0.26	0.01	0.24	0.28	0.25	0.01	0.23	0.27
Turkmenistan					0.72	0.23	0.39	1.36	0.32	0.12	0.16	0.65
Uganda					1.11	0.09	0.95	1.29	1.09	0.09	0.93	1.27
Ukraine					0.12	0.01	0.11	0.14	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.11
United States					0.12	0.04	0.06	0.23	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.18
Uzbekistan					0.16	0.02	0.12	0.20	0.12	0.02	0.09	0.15
Venezuela					0.15	0.03	0.10	0.24	0.10	0.02	0.07	0.15
Vietnam					0.08	0.01	0.06	0.11	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.10
Western Sahara					0.46	0.06	0.36	0.58	0.49	0.06	0.38	0.63
Yemen					0.62	0.07	0.49	0.78	0.42	0.06	0.32	0.55

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Zambia					0.45	0.15	0.23	0.87	0.31	0.11	0.16	0.61
Zimbabwe					0.28	0.04	0.21	0.36	0.24	0.03	0.19	0.32
Stateless					1.43	0.05	1.34	1.53	5.10	0.18	4.77	5.46
Unknown					4.99	0.17	4.67	5.33	1.34	0.05	1.26	1.44
<b>Age</b>												
From 18 to 34 years (ref)												
Less than 14 years									1.01	0.05	0.91	1.12
From 14 to 17 years									1.51	0.03	1.45	1.58
From 35 to 64 years									1.02	0.01	0.99	1.04
65 years or over									1.87	0.03	1.82	1.93
Unknown									1.19	0.12	0.98	1.44
<b>Sex</b>												
Males (ref)												
Females									1.26	0.01	1.23	1.29
Unknown									3.56	0.37	2.90	4.37
N	388,340				387,350				387,350			
Correctly classified	68.4%				83.6%				84.1%			
Efron pseudo r2	0.14				0.51				0.52			





## Appendix 3 95% Confidence interval for the adjusted recognition rates

	Model 2		Model 3		Model 5		Model 6	
	min	max	min	max	min	max	min	max
Belgium	44%	45%	44%	45%	44%	46%	44%	45%
Bulgaria	50%	53%	47%	50%	53%	56%	50%	53%
Croatia	17%	32%	16%	33%	16%	31%	14%	31%
Cyprus	45%	48%	43%	46%	47%	50%	44%	47%
Czech	51%	56%	50%	55%	49%	54%	49%	53%
Denmark	39%	40%	38%	39%	38%	40%	37%	39%
Estonia	26%	59%	22%	56%	27%	58%	22%	56%
Finland	64%	67%	51%	54%	56%	59%	47%	50%
France	42%	43%	41%	42%	41%	42%	40%	41%
Germany	44%	44%	42%	43%	42%	43%	40%	41%
Greece	23%	25%	24%	26%	23%	24%	23%	24%
Hungary	25%	27%	24%	26%	25%	28%	24%	26%
Iceland	18%	34%	14%	30%	16%	33%	12%	29%
Ireland	49%	53%	45%	48%	48%	52%	45%	49%
Italy	66%	67%	67%	68%	48%	49%	48%	49%
Latvia	28%	35%	22%	29%	30%	37%	24%	32%
Lithuania	52%	61%	49%	60%	53%	62%	50%	59%
Luxembourg	35%	41%	28%	35%	35%	41%	29%	36%
Malta	56%	60%	55%	59%	48%	51%	47%	50%
Netherlands	40%	41%	39%	40%	36%	37%	35%	36%
Norway	43%	45%	41%	43%	40%	42%	39%	40%
Poland	43%	46%	42%	45%	33%	36%	31%	34%
Portugal	42%	53%	35%	45%	43%	54%	38%	48%
Romania	28%	31%	26%	28%	29%	32%	27%	30%
Slovakia	50%	61%	38%	47%	33%	41%	24%	33%
Slovenia	42%	52%	31%	42%	41%	51%	32%	43%
Spain	39%	41%	38%	40%	40%	42%	39%	41%
Sweden	50%	52%	48%	49%	46%	47%	45%	46%
Switzerland	58%	59%	56%	58%	30%	31%	28%	29%
UK	41%	42%	39%	41%	36%	37%	35%	36%